Viewpoints Special Edition

Iraq's Refugee and IDP Crisis: Human Toll and Implications

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A Special Edition of *Viewpoints*

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Refugee

The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, approved in 1951 and amended in 1967, defines a refugee as: "A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

Internally Displaced Person (IDP)

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, IDPs "are individuals or groups of people who have been forced to flee their homes to escape armed conflict, generalized violence and human rights abuses ... Often both [refugees and IDPs] leave their homes for similar reasons. Civilians are recognized as 'refugees' when they cross an international frontier to seek sanctuary in another country. The internally displaced, for whatever reason, remain in their own states."[1]

1. "Internally Displaced People: Questions & Answers," UNHCR, 2007, pp. 607, http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/405ef8c64.pdf.

Preface

Wendy Chamberlin

In the comparatively short time since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1920, the country has experienced successive waves of forced migration. Yet the magnitude of the forced displacement of Iraqis from their homes since 2003 is unprecedented. In addition to the still dire humanitarian situation are the potentially far-reaching negative implications of the refugee/IDP crisis for the future of Iraq and the Middle East as a whole.

Wendy Chamberlin is President of the Middle East Institute. She was ambassador to Pakistan (2001-2) and Laos (1996-99) as well as Deputy High Commissioner for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Assistant Administrator in the Asia-Near East Bureau for the US Agency for International Development.

What were the factors that triggered and sustained the massive flow of refugees and internally displaced persons? How many and which Iraqis comprise the refugee and IDP populations? Have the United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI) responded to the crisis in a manner commensurate with their moral responsibility and capabilities? How have the constraints and concerns of Iraq's immediate neighbors, which have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis, affected their response? Are conditions in Iraq conducive to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons? What are likely to be the consequences if a substantial portion of these populations are unable to return home and their living conditions do not improve? What priorities and considerations should guide policymakers' thinking and planning with respect to the refugee/IDP challenge? These are but a few of the questions that deserve more public discussion and debate than they have hitherto received.

This project aims to stimulate such a discussion. To examine some of these issues, we have solicited the contributions of a distinguished group of analysts and supplemented their essays with statistical and other salient information. The compilation of essays begins, fittingly, with an Introduction by Dr. Phebe Marr. It was she who breathed life into the project, and it is to her that this enterprise is dedicated.

For decades, Phebe Marr, through her teaching, scholarship, and policy analysis has enriched understanding of the Middle East — particularly of Iraq — and has informed policy debates about the US interests and role in the region. For much of her career, Phebe has been closely associated with the Middle East Institute — as author of numerous articles and book reviews for *The Middle East Journal* (*MEJ*), as a longtime member of the *MEJ* Board of Editors, as conference panelist, and workshop participant.

The fact that Phebe was the source of inspiration for this project is not surprising, given these longstanding ties to MEI and her respect and affection for the people of Iraq. Nor is it surprising, given Phebe's trademark approach to complex policy challenges, that the essays gathered in this volume explore a number of facets of the Iraqi refugee/IDP crisis from a variety of vantage points.

The Middle East Institute is grateful to Dr. Phebe Marr and the other authors for contributing to this special edition of MEI *Viewpoints* — and thus highlighting issues that are of great consequence not only for the many victims of displacement, but also for the long-term future of Iraq, the Middle East, and the US interests there.

Introduction

Phebe Marr

While Iraq has been suffering from a slow outflow of its population for decades, it was the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra' on February 22, 2006 and the vicious sectarian killing which followed, mostly in Baghdad, that led to an unprecedented displacement of people — only recently brought under control by the US surge of troops. Despite the magnitude of the resulting humanitarian crisis and the long-term significance of this demographic shift for Iraq and for the region, the story has been relatively neglected. This special edition of *Viewpoints* examines the sources, scope, and far-reaching implications of Iraq's refugee crisis.

Phebe Marr is a prominent historian of modern Iraq. A retired professor, she was research professor at the National Defense University and a professor of history at the University of Tennessee and at Stanislaus State University in California. She is the author of The Modern History of Iraq *(Second Edition, Westview Press, 2003). She is a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of* The Middle East Journal.

Figures on the displacement vary, but most sources estimate that it may have reached four to five million or about 15% of the Iraqi population.[1] Some two million Iraqis have emigrated to the region, primarily to Syria and Jordan. The rest have gone to Egypt, Lebanon, the Arab Gulf countries, and Europe. The United States has taken in fewer than 10,000 under a strict visa policy that has come under increasing criticism.[2] The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is even more difficult to track, but is estimated at over two million. Much of this recent displacement has taken place in mixed areas such as Baghdad and in central provinces like Diyala where, traditionally, Arabs and Kurds, Shi'a and Sunnis often lived in the same neighborhood or in close proximity.[3] This population has probably shifted to areas where family members or those of a similar sect or ethnic group can provide protection. Were this population not to return to its original location — a highly likely prospect — Iraq's ethnic and sectarian map, and hence the country's political and social structure, would be profoundly affected.

1. The figures are difficult to verify and are often disputed. One UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report estimates that five million Iraqis — one in five — have been displaced. (International Crisis Group Report No. 77, "Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon," July 10, 2008 (Hereinafter ICG Report #77), p. 1. Another UNHCR report puts the figure lower — four million, some 2.2 million IDPs and up to two million refugees (ICG Report # 77, p. 1, fn 4). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) in its July 1, 2008 Bi-Weekly Report, "Emergency Needs Assessment," estimates that Iraqi IDPs alone total 2.8 million. It must be noted that of this number, 1.6 million, or 57% were estimated to have been displaced after February 2006; the rest before. (IOM Bi-Weekly Report, July 1, 2008, p. 1). Whatever the figures, UNHCR ranks Iraq's IDP and refugee crisis as the world's second most serious, after Afghanistan.
2. The US accepted 1,608 Iraqi refugees in fiscal year 2007, 4,742 through May 2008, with another 7,000 awaiting response. (ICG Report # 77, p. 35.).
3. This conclusion is based on a recent IOM assessment of about 180,000 families or over one million individuals. In this group, some 58% were Shi'a; 30% Sunni, and 3.5% Kurds. (IOM Bi-Weekly Report, July 1, 2008, p. 2).

Although various international institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been dealing with the humanitarian crisis stemming from this massive population movement, thus far the response has been inadequate, especially from the two governments most directly involved — the United States and Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of families have been hastily uprooted and have had to resettle elsewhere, sometimes in appalling conditions. The better educated, middle class refugees who have gone mainly to Jordan and Syria are best able to adjust, but they now face the loss of their savings, jobs, and adequate schooling for their children. Many live in substandard housing, face rising health problems, and confront an uncertain future. The poorer Iraqis are in even more dire straights and, of course, are more difficult to absorb. All the evidence suggests that these refugees want to return to Iraq — and to the homes they left. According to some of the essays that follow, the circumstances that caused them to leave (i.e., lack of security, ethnic and sectarian conflict, fear of crime) have not changed sufficiently to enable them to do so.

If much of the refugee population currently residing in neighboring countries neither succeeds in returning to Iraq nor becomes well integrated where they are now settled, the region may face serious political — and even security problems.

Over the longer term, if much of the refugee population currently residing in neighboring countries neither succeeds in returning to Iraq nor becomes well integrated where they are now settled, the region may face serious political — and even security problems. While not settled in refugee camps like the Palestinians, the Iraqi population is concentrated in certain areas, mainly in specific quarters of cities like Damascus and ʻAmman, where their poorer conditions and reduced status may feed discontent. While the poor are always a rich recruiting ground for radical movements, many of the middle class refugees are bitter about their loss of position and status, a situation that may be magnified among the younger generation now deprived of the future they had come to expect. Much of this displacement was due to sectarian conflict and includes a disproportionate number of Sunni refugees; the presence of this refugee community could contribute to regional Sunni-Shiʻa tensions if not carefully handled.[4]

Meanwhile, the burden on the states of the region, all of which face political, economic, and social problems of their own, is mounting. While the Iraqi refugees do not appear to threaten state structures, they are putting increasing burdens on infrastructure including housing, health care, and schooling — especially in a period of rising prices of fuel, food, and real estate. Far fewer Iraqis have gone to the Gulf states, which are much better able to afford their presence. Indeed, these countries should be urged to do more in addressing the problem, especially financially. The reluctance of the Sunni-run Arab states of the Gulf to help probably reflects their uneasiness about the emerging Shiʻa and Kurdish dominated government in Iraq.

Besides the humanitarian problem, the new demographic shift raises several long-term issues. Inside Iraq, the process has made Baghdad, the country's center, a far more segmented society than it had been. Maps of Baghdad over the last two to

4. Figures on a sectarian breakdown are scarce, but a UNHCR registration suggests that about 57% of the refugees in Syria, 68% in Jordan, are Sunni. (CG Report #77, p. 29, fn 236).

three years starkly reveal the "sorting process" as more "homogeneous" quarters have emerged — all Shi'a, or all Sunni — thereby reducing neighborhoods whose families used to live together on the basis of class or economic status to those based on sectarian identification. The sorting has unfortunately been encouraged by the security measures taken by the Multinational Force (MNF). To prevent attacks, various quarters have now been surrounded by security barriers (walls topped with barbed wire) and checkpoints manned by local militias. These measures have calmed the security situation but have made Baghdad into an environment resembling a medieval town. Walls are more difficult to break down than to build up.[5]

The segmentation of Baghdad is by no means complete, but it has advanced considerably in the last year and a half. And as the IDPs scatter throughout Iraq, their departure raises the question of whether the rest of Iraq will also become a more segmented society. As local government is strengthened and provincial councils are elected at the end of this year, this kind of segmentation could skew the political process and contribute to the institutionalization of confessionalism.

A similar process has been taking place in the north in Kurdistan, focused on Kirkuk and its surrounding areas. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which wants to spread its authority to areas where Kurds are a majority, is trying to rearrange the demography in surrounding regions. Although not directly related to the sectarian conflict in Baghdad, the Kurdish desire to extend their control to Kirkuk and other "Kurdish majority" provinces is causing similar ethnic displacement in the north as Arabs, who were resettled there (often forcefully) by Saddam in past decades, are encouraged to leave and are compensated. Although this process has been more peaceful, it too will rearrange population on an ethnic and sectarian basis. However, the KRG has temporarily taken in many Arab IDPs from the south, although they are carefully watched.[6]

Still another issue is the reduction in the diversity of Iraq's population, once one of its greatest strengths. Minorities are leaving Iraq in large numbers, especially Christians.

Still another issue is the reduction in the diversity of Iraq's population, once one of its greatest strengths. Minorities are leaving Iraq in large numbers, especially Christians. Attacks on churches and other religious minorities like the Yazidis, have increased in the last few years. This parallels the turbulence in Iraq during which the country lost much of its ancient Jewish community, which had numbered about 150,00 (2% of the population) in 1947. Attacks on the Jewish community in 1941 began the exodus, which accelerated in the 1950s and the late 1960s. Today, the number of Jews may be counted on two hands. The diverse Christian community is likewise shrinking dramatically, especially the Chaldo-Assyrian Churches. Twenty years ago, Christians numbered about 1.4 million; today they are estimated at about 700,000, half their earlier number, and are diminishing rapidly as Islamic religiosity and sectarianism rise.[7]

5. For a vivid, on-the-ground description of this situation, see Nir Rosen, "The Great Divide," *The National*, June 5, 2008. http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080605/REVIEW/708177227/1043&profile=10.
6. Much of the earlier displacement of the Iraqi population took place in the Kurdish north and the Shi'a south.
7. Keith Roderick, "Iraq's Christian Exodus," *National Review Online*, July 30, 2007, http:// article.nationalreview.com. There have been attacks on Christian churches and clergy, the most infamous of which was the kidnapping and death of the Chaldean Archbishop of Mosul, Paulos Faraj Rahho, in February 2008.

A third issue relates not to ethnicity or sect, but to class and "capacity." Many of those who have fled Iraq were the country's skilled, educated class — regardless of sect or ethnic background. (They have followed a long line of educated Iraqis who left during Saddam's repression, the Iran-Iraq War, and the sanctions era.) This loss of experience and skills has been detrimental to the functioning of the economic and political system as well as the development of non-sectarian security forces. Can Iraq persuade its skilled elite to return? If they do not — and there is little evidence that they are — Iraq must develop a whole new generation of educated Iraqis to run the country and its institutions. Western policy makers have scarcely begun to consider this problem. Indeed, the discontinuity in leadership is striking, except for the Kurds, who have been running their affairs in the north for years, and will take decades to rectify.

This new exodus has hollowed out Baghdad, once the intellectual and administrative center of the country. The result may be a shift in the balance of power in Baghdad to Sadr City and the poorer, working classes that supposedly inhabit it — a major social transition. The more well-to-do areas of Baghdad like Mansur, Karrada, and the university quarter, composed of professionals of mixed sectarian and ethnic background, have always looked askance at the newly urbanized migrants in the satellite "suburbs" around Baghdad — on a class basis. The feeling was reciprocated. While this class distinction could be overdone, its importance is often overlooked. This shift in class structure and skills may be every bit as important as the ethnic and sectarian change with great significance for Iraq's ability to govern itself and to progress in the directions seemingly favored by American policy makers.

[The] loss of experience and skills has been detrimental to the functioning of the economic and political system as well as the development of non-sectarian security forces. Can Iraq persuade its skilled elite to return?

In sum, while the current Iraqi demographic shift is not the first in its modern history, it is significant because of its size and the conditions under which it has taken place. The immediate humanitarian needs created by the outflow are clear, both for the refugees and for the regional states now hosting them, who find themselves increasingly overburdened and have closed the door to future inflows. The return of the refugees to Iraq is highly desirable but may be even more difficult than their departure. If most do not return, the international community may have long-term problems on its hands. One may be a permanently disaffected Iraqi community abroad (particularly its younger generation), likely to be prone to recruitment by radical, anti-American groups in a region where religious and nationalist conflict is rising. Inside Iraq, the exodus and the IDPs have resulted in significant ethnic and sectarian shifts in the population, especially in Baghdad. These include a possible permanent loss of some of its Sunni population, a reduction in the Christian community, and increased ethnic and sectarian segmentation, all of which could have repercussions in the political system, thereby reinforcing rather than mitigating ethnic and communal identity. Another reason for concern is the exodus of Iraq's skilled middle class. If most of this group cannot be persuaded to come back, a new generation of educated professionals will have to be trained. A Baghdad-based middle class that had usually leaned toward moderation and more secular ways has been weakened and a new, less educated, younger population, symbolized — perhaps unfairly — by "Sadr City," is now statistically more significant. What all this will mean for Iraq's long-term future needs must be given serious consideration by policy makers, even as they deal with the more urgent, short-term consequences of this crisis.

I

Contours and Context

Forcible Eviction in Iraq: Past Practices and Current Crisis

Nasir Ahmed Al-Samaraie

The issue of travel and refuge is not an odd or a new feature of world history or of the history of the Middle East. Stories of travel and displacement are clearly highlighted in the religious literature of the area and deeply engraved in the principles and teachings of the Abrahamic faiths. Over the centuries, in the Middle East as elsewhere, the precipitating factors of mass population movement have varied from hope and ambition to despair and fear.

Nasir Ahmed Al-Samaraie, former ambassador at the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In living memory, Iraqi society has witnessed successive waves of population movement both internally and across its borders. Some of these migrations have been voluntary, peaceful, and ultimately beneficial — as people have sought and attained better living prospects and job opportunities. However, Iraq also has experienced forced displacement/eviction — the ugly face of human movement all over the world.

Indeed, forced displacement/eviction has long been employed by Iraqi societal and state institutions. It has been used as a preventive and protective measure against those who might endanger social peace and harmony. It also has been used as an instrument of tribal and social justice, that is, as a means of punishing individuals or groups for wrong doings that could not otherwise be remedied by financial and other types of settlement. This practice was part of the tribal and communal authority exercised in the absence, weakness, or lack of confidence in the state power or jurisdiction. Whereas in some instances the period of forcible eviction was of limited duration, in others it was permanent. And while some judgments of punishment by eviction were meted out against individuals, others were imposed against groups or entire communities.

During the early years following the establishment of the state in 1920, Iraqi authorities imposed punishment by displacement or exile upon select politicians, community leaders, clans, and various population groups. At a later stage (following the 1958 republican era), this practice was applied against larger groups or ethnicities, expanding alarmingly to hundreds of thousands of civilians in total disregard of their suffering.

The pre-1958 state displaced different ethnic groups in the north. Meanwhile, it ignored the feudal aristocracy's oppression and commission of atrocities against peasants in the south by offering them shantytowns and degraded living conditions in and around Baghdad and other major cities. The post-1958 state continued these practices, but on a

larger and wider scale. Individual or small group misconduct resulted in punishment of the entire clan or tribe. The sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1991 turned into a punishment of the entire nation. Hundreds of thousands left the country in an effort to escape their increasingly desperate circumstances.

It may be fair and reasonable to assume that the practice of forced displacement as a form of collective punishment originated in society and was adopted by the state. The Iraqi state born in 1920 has its roots in both Ottoman administrative practices and British colonial ethics and principles. The result of this unwieldy combination has been Iraqi institutions that value work over deliverables and that implement what others plan. The "others" — those who plan — are politicians or leaders whose authority may not be questioned and who are generally unaccountable. This model, or rather pathology, of the Iraqi state persists. And it is precisely this dominant and pernicious characteristic of the Iraqi state that has been responsible for the forcible evictions of a massive number of Iraqi citizens over the years.

Since 2003, more than five million Iraqis have been evicted forcibly from their homes in different ways and by all warring parties. Half found their way to neighboring countries while the other half is internally displaced. Those temporarily located in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and other countries have found themselves living in difficult, if not desperate, conditions. As a result, they are questioning their previous norms and beliefs in relation to the host countries and to their own country. The inherited principles of solidarity and pan-Arabism practiced for decades failed the test after the harsh and bitter experience of Iraqis who have crossed the borders. Far worse is the experience of internally displaced Iraqis, brothers in faith and fellow citizens of those in various governorates who nonetheless have been less than welcoming. In both cases, the host communities saw them as a burden, security risk, competitors, and a nuisance. Some of these reactions may be justified by the limited resources and job opportunities of the receiving communities; however, this reception has created a deep sadness fused with bitterness among displaced Iraqis. Their dignity and standards of stability have fallen victim to the rules and regulations of the host country, and also to uncertainty about their future.

The current situation in Iraq — that of a divided society — compels the evictees to stay away, a bitter choice.

The *status quo* in Iraq today is marked by communal terrorization, threats to adhere and submit or to risk becoming a "legitimate" target, and non-willingness to accept and tolerate others as equals. Thus the current eviction phenomenon is but a continuation of the previous tragic experiences that have been widely reported and condemned. The ethnic and sectarian ghettos that have been established to control violence hamper the possibility of return. It is also hampered by the apparent absence of a workable arrangement for a long-lasting solution. The current situation in Iraq — that of a divided society — compels the evictees to stay away, a bitter choice. The continuation of this trend will eventually threaten the breakdown of society, which is rooted in the extended family and tribal and communal connections.

US Policy and the Creation of a Sectarian Iraq

Nabil Al-Tikriti

Commentators frequently affirm that sectarian violence in Iraq springs from age-old ethnic tensions which long pre-date American involvement in the region. While the relevant sectarian *identities* do date back several centuries, sectarian *violence* has not persisted as a social constant throughout the millennia. In the case of Iraq, key US policy choices made in the wake of the 2003 invasion, whether purposefully or unwittingly, have led to a progressive, incessant increase in sectarian tensions culminating in the violent geographic consolidation of ethnic mapping.

Nabil Al-Tikriti is Senior Fellow, Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program at the US Institute of Peace. Following a substantial career in the non-governmental organization sector, he joined the Department of History and American Studies at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia in 2004.

Under Iraq's *ancien régime*, national space was dominated by a self-defined and self-consciously secularist approach, whereby communitarian or ethnic nationalist extremism was violently suppressed by the state on behalf of those living in the cosmopolitan capital of Baghdad. Within this paradigm, social divisions primarily reflected levels of urbanization, class attainment, political power, tribal membership, or national identity rather than sectarian affiliation. Before 2003, one might usefully classify Iraqi society as being divided between Baghdad and the rest of the country, Ba'th party members and the rest of society, Kurdish nationalists and their opponents, communitarian activists and secularists, and several other categories that no longer carry the same relevance.

Prior to the March 2003 invasion, US policymakers, rather than recognizing the relevance of such classifications, tended to see Iraq through a tripartite lens allowing for only three types of actors: Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurds. Due to certain policies implemented by the occupying power, this tripartite lens has become a self-fulfilling paradigm. In effect, Iraq's new "imagined community" was imagined in Washington.

Invasion enthusiasts were quite clear that the Iraq encountered upon arrival would no longer be allowed to exist. Consistent with Condoleezza Rice's doctrine of "creative chaos," early policies eliminated the Iraqi state and symbols of common national identity. Sectarian-minded actors stepped into the vacuum while occupation forces passively observed the unraveling of the national fabric.

Contending that 13 years of sanctions and the invasion had rendered Iraq's economic structures obsolete, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) head Paul Bremer ordered the complete and immediate dismantling of Iraq's massive state sector. Including dairy plants, cigarette factories, battery production lines, cement factories, and several others,

this sector had long employed the largest bloc of the country's workforce. The dissolution of hundreds of thousands of stable jobs further degraded social capital and led individuals to seek financial shelter through employment in sectarian militias.

Parallel with efforts to instantly privatize Iraq's state sector was a comprehensive $18 billion reconstruction program announced with some fanfare by the Bush Administration shortly after the completion of the invasion. As the program's "no-bid" contracts were almost exclusively channeled to US corporate entities, Iraqi institutions were effectively frozen out of any stake in their own reconstruction program. While Iraqi returnees frequently sub-contracted several tasks on these contracts, locals often found that the only job open for them in this process was manual labor. Not surprisingly, this program orientation tended to alienate the Iraqi domestic elite, while its failure to share out reconstruction patronage resources contributed to the country's economic collapse.

Ambassador Bremer's infamous de-Ba'thification order, justified as spearheading the construction of an entirely new social order, effectively disemployed the entire Iraqi management strata — over 120,000 people — from state service, while at the same time forcing underground the single most visible remaining group of nationalist actors within Iraqi society. Usually portrayed as anti-Sunni Arab, this order could equally be seen as damaging to secularists, Christians, smaller minorities, and feminists. However, by tarring all Sunni Arabs with the brush of Ba'thism, American policymakers effectively encouraged sectarian revenge. At the same time, the high percentage of Ba'thists among the former cadres of government technocrats meant that this order allowed largely sectarian exile groups to fill nearly all governmental posts opened up by occupation authorities at the time. This last outcome exacerbated tensions between exiles and locals who had never left the country.

Sectarian-minded actors stepped into the vacuum while occupation forces passively observed the unravelling of the national fabric.

In the same week, Ambassador Bremer announced the dissolution of the entire Iraqi military, an estimated 500,000 men under arms. While CPA officials generally perceived the Iraqi military as "Saddam's Army," most non-Kurdish Iraqis saw the military as a professional, secular, and national institution capable of keeping the country unified in a time of crisis. While certain units like the Special Republican Guards were widely perceived as tribal protectors of the former regime, the vast majority of the military was seen as largely outside of politics. The security vacuum caused by the final dissolution of this national institution was quickly filled by sectarian militias returning from exile in the summer of 2003.

Once Bush Administration officials conceded that functioning Iraqi security forces were a necessity amid a growing insurgency, they began stating that US forces would "stand down" when Iraqi forces would "stand up." In an attempt to make up for Bremer's dissolution of the Iraqi military, American officials strove to quickly re-constitute the Iraqi mili-

tary in order to share security duties with coalition forces. Rather than integrating militia members into Iraqi security forces while disarming militia units, advisors usually incorporated entire units of party militias into Iraqi security forces while disarming militia units, leaving such units intact, legitimized, and better armed. At the same time, former Iraqi military officers were largely frozen out of the new institution in a manner consistent with earlier policies. As a result, civilians who did not share either the sectarian makeup or the political perspectives of these units quickly came to fear and oppose them.

On July 13, 2003, Ambassador Bremer appointed — according to an explicitly sectarian population formula — a 25-person Interim Governing Council (IGC) to act as an advisory body to the CPA. A preponderance of diaspora returnees were chosen for this council at the expense of locals — most notably the nationally-minded Muqtada al-Sadr — who had never left Iraq throughout the previous regime's rule. Reacting to his bald exclusion from power, a month later Sadr announced the formation of his "Mahdi Army," which quickly flourished into one of the major sectarian militias in Iraqi politics today. The preference for diaspora returnees over locals, combined with the population formulas used to structure this nascent government, forced into being a newly sectarian political reality from which Iraq has yet to recover.

[The] "surge" strategy has both reduced sectarian violence and nearly consolidated the tripartite division of Iraq that some in Washington envisioned in 2003.

As the security situation continued to deteriorate during all of 2004, voters throughout the country began seeking safety in parties who promised to protect them in their neighborhoods, villages, and towns. As a result, the transitional parliamentary elections of January 2005 resulted in a landslide for sectarian-based parties. In the summer of 2005, American diplomats shepherded a new constitution through a summer of intense and heated negotiations amongst these elected parties and certain unelected political groups. As if to institutionalize the newly sectarian face of Iraqi politics, the constitution included provisions allowing for governorates to band together as federal regions with certain prerogatives of sovereignty, creating the potential for *de facto* regional partition. At the same time, clauses ensuring the funneling of oil revenues through such provincial structures combined with ambiguous statutes concerning the freedom of such regional institutions to negotiate international contracts, encouraging the fiscal fracturing of the national whole. Finally, the Kirkuk referendum guaranteed by the constitution ensured a poisonous sectarian pill for the future.

The February 2006 Samarra bombing is commonly seen as sealing the fate of cosmopolitan Iraq, and even the recent drop in violence has largely reflected the ending of sectarian diversity. By facilitating forced migration, erecting separation walls between Baghdad neighborhoods, encouraging the permanent resettlement of Iraq's displaced populations, and creating fresh regional militias such as *al-Sahwa*, General David Petraeus' "surge" strategy has both reduced sectarian violence and nearly consolidated the tripartite division of Iraq that some in Washington envisioned in 2003. In spite of the relative calm of recent months, millions of Iraqis hope that such sectarian consolidation might some day be reversible.

II

Uprooted Populations and Their Reluctant Hosts

Jordan's Transient Iraqi Guests: Transnational Dynamics and National Agenda

Géraldine Chatelard

Between 1990 and 2002, Iraqis came to Jordan in great numbers. According to the Jordanian Department of Statistics, by 2002 the number had reached nearly 300,000. Over that period, Jordan was also the main transit point for the more than 700,000 Iraqis to whom Western countries granted refugee status or other forms of asylum, or who were received within immigration regimes. By the Department of Statistics' account, those who came to stay in Jordan after 2003 are no more than 200,000. Tens — if not hundreds — of thousands of those who were in Jordan in 2002 or who came in the following years have since proceeded to Western or other Arab countries.

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The number of Iraqi exiles in Jordan is bound to diminish further now that the borders have been closed except to visa holders. This is not because most will return but because they are ideal candidates for secondary migration; predominantly belonging to the educated urban middle class and lacking social and economic opportunities in Jordan, Iraqi exiles are prone to respond to the pull of family and other social ties from within distant diasporas that reached a critical mass and global scope during the 1990s. The dynamics of chain migration are currently so strong that neither changes in the situation in Iraq nor stringent access policies by Western countries are likely to reverse the trend of migration out of the region. Only those who do not have sufficient connections in distant diasporas or lack the financial or educational capital to compensate for weak transnational ties will stay in Arab host countries or return to Iraq. Alternatively, a small number of political or economic entrepreneurs will keep using Arab countries as regional bases for activities that span several national boundaries in the Middle East and beyond. This hypothesis, congruent with theories of migration and transnationalism, challenges the relevance of such concepts as return and repatriation for those whom international agencies categorize as refugees.

Like most other Arab countries, Jordan has received Iraqi exiles as temporary guests within a discretionary toleration regime grounded in eroded commitments to Pan-Arabism. The large majority have lacked legal residency and consequent social and economic rights. Despite the scale of the migration in the pre-2003 period, Jordan was spared international pressure to provide Iraqis with assistance. The situation was reversed after international and non-governmental organizations took up the issue of Iraqi displacement as part of a discourse on the illegitimacy and failure of American

intervention in Iraq. However, Jordan has managed to channel international assistance in a way that most likely will not affect the conditions and migration trends of its Iraqi guests.

On the occasion of the April 2007 UN Conference on Displaced Iraqis in Geneva, Jordan claimed that 750,000 Iraqis were residing there, costing the country $1.6 billion a year. Jordan called for international support to alleviate this "burden" on the national economy, but opposed the idea of a parallel aid system. In response to this call, the government received (as of late May 2008) $58.3 million in bilateral or multilateral aid to improve facilities in sectors subsidized by public funds. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), having until then unsuccessfully advocated for a temporary protection regime for Iraqis it defined as refugees, reframed its operations: In 2007, 61% of the agency's operational budget for Jordan was given directly to the Ministries of Health and Education in addition to direct assistance provided to underprivileged Jordanians alongside Iraqis. For its part, the Ministry of Social Development mandated that international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating programs for Iraqis in Jordan should ensure that at least 20% of their beneficiaries were poor Jordanians.

The Jordanian authorities have made government schools and the public health system accessible to all Iraqis since 2007. Nevertheless, it is evident that the figures they use in funding appeals are grossly inflated and that the number of Iraqis who use the services of the public sector and of international NGOs remains comparatively very low. Fewer than 20,000 Iraqi children are enrolled in public schools; few individuals approach public health services, and no more than 60,000 use assistance programs operated by NGOs.

On the domestic stage, the Jordanian government's position *vis-à-vis* Iraqi guests continues to be expressed exclusively in terms of concerns for national security in the face of terrorism, crime, and other threats that could spill over from Iraq.

On the domestic stage, the Jordanian government's position *vis-à-vis* Iraqi guests continues to be expressed exclusively in terms of concerns for national security in the face of terrorism, crime, and other threats that could spill over from Iraq. Calls for international support include security and precaution measures for which national expenditures have increased by 20% since 2005, allegedly to prevent terrorist attacks from foreign elements but also, one may contend, to suppress domestic discontent that could ensue from a deteriorating economic situation. As public subsidies are being lifted on basic goods and inflation is rising (from 1.6% in 2003 to an expected 9% in 2008), the purchasing power of the traditional middle-class is plummeting. Thirteen percent of Jordanians live under the poverty line, and at least 14.5% are unemployed.

Presented as "burden-sharing" for Iraqi refugees, the current assistance framework does not provide for a binding contractual mechanism that would make Jordan accountable to donors for an equitable allocation of aid to Iraqis, nor

for granting them a wider set of rights — in particular residency and legal access to jobs. Jordan has in fact imposed a development approach that meets its priorities of alleviating the effects of economic reform on the Jordanian population and tightening security measures. In doing so, Jordan continues to be functionally a *rentier* entity in which foreign aid goes to consolidating national institutions and the regime with the acquiescence of donors.

Jordanian officials have declared that all parties "must work on facilitating the appropriate conditions that will ensure the return of Iraqis to Iraq" in the shortest possible timeframe. More likely, the approach taken provides conditions that will ensure the secondary migration of Jordan's guests to other, mostly Western, countries in the short or medium term, in a continuation of the pre-2003 trend. This is not quite the outcome envisioned by those who, in the 1990s, conceptualized "burden-sharing" as the containment of refugees in their regions of origin.

Presented as "burden-sharing" for Iraqi refugees, the current assistance framework does not provide for a binding contractual mechanism that would make Jordan accountable to donors for an equitable allocation of aid to Iraqis, nor for granting them a wider set of rights — in particular residency and legal access to jobs.

Re-communitarization *en route*: Iraqi Christian Transit Migrants in Istanbul

Didem Danış

Today the gravity of the general disorder in Iraq is well known; therefore, explaining the motivations of the enormous number of Iraqis who have fled the country would seem redundant. Not so, however, in the cases of the weakest minorities, such as the Turkmens and the Christians of northern Iraq. Due to the limitations of space, this essay focuses on Iraqi Christians, for whom both the departure and transit stay in neighboring countries are determined by the policy orientations of the related states and migration conditions that tend to reinforce communitarian ties among the migrants.

Didem Danış has taught sociology at Galatasaray University in Istanbul since 2005. Her PhD thesis is on Iraqi transit migrants in Turkey with a focus on the interaction between social networks, including transnational ones, and political reception mechanisms.

OBLIGATORY FLIGHT

The increasing Islamization of Iraq has been one of the unintentional consequences of American intervention since the 1991 Gulf War. The Iraqi Christian flight has further increased since 2003. While Kurds and Shi'ites have been the primary political beneficiaries of the post-Saddam order in Iraq, Christians and Turkmen have become the losers. The sectarian violence and new ethno-religious hierarchies that followed the fall of the Saddam Husayn regime have obliged the most precariously positioned groups to emigrate, as spelled out by Wassim, a 51-year-old Chaldean man from Mosul: "Many [Christian] people leave Iraq. Our life became tough after the war ... Saddam was good to Christians; when he became weak, we became weak too. When he was collapsed, we were collapsed too."

The ones who stayed in Iraq are confined in shrinking communities and thus are even more vulnerable. Since 2003, anti-Christian hostility in Iraq has intensified. Stigmatized as "collaborators of occupation forces," Iraqi Christians face ever-increasing verbal and physical violence. Varda, a Chaldean man from Baghdad, left Iraq in a "quest for safety" after the 2003 US invasion. His ten-year-old son, the only Christian student at his school, was accused by his peers of "inviting the Americans into the country." Varda's taxi was burned out. Finally, as the daily anxiety became unbearable, he and his family decided to emigrate. In short, the disappearance of central authority, even if it was highly authoritarian, made the situation "unbearable" for minorities. Accordingly, transit migrants in Turkey complained repeatedly about the authority void in Iraq: "Before there was only one Saddam, but now there are one thousand."

OBLIGATORY TRANSIT

Turkey is one of the major passageways for Iraqi Christian exiles. Like many other countries located on the periphery of the West, Turkish territory has acquired a new position in the global migration system. There emerged new flows with hundreds of thousands of migrants who target Turkey as a temporary workplace or a transit stop. Iraqis constitute a significant but invisible group among these transit migrants in Turkey. It is difficult to estimate the actual number of Iraqis who crossed into Turkish territory, since most of them lack official papers. Still, the size of this group can be assessed by looking at the number of foreigners who are arrested by Turkish authorities. From 1995 to 2004, some 100,000 irregular Iraqi migrants were apprehended, thus suggesting that Iraqis had become number one among irregular migrant groups in Turkey.

What causes Iraqis to be stuck in a status of "illegality" is related to the changing migratory context in the region. Once an emigration country, Turkey has become since the 1990s an important transit country for persons originating from Asia and Africa. The number of these migrants, whose main intention is to reach the West, began to grow because of the concomitant closure of Western territories to newcomers. The strengthening of border controls as well as the hardening of admission regulations compels many to wait for indefinite periods of time in transit countries.

Aware of legal hurdles, most of the Iraqis realize that they have very little, if any, chance to settle permanently in Turkey.

The reaction of Turkish authorities to the growing number of transit migrants has been to ignore, if not to reject, their presence. The Turkish legal framework related to migrants and refugees buttresses this approach. Iraqis, together with other non-European asylum-seekers, do not have the right to settle as refugees in Turkey due to the preservation of geographical limitation on the Geneva Convention. Aware of legal hurdles, most of the Iraqis realize that they have very little, if any, chance to settle permanently in Turkey. So, they consider their stay to be transitory and struggle to reach Western countries as soon as possible.

Despite this aspiration to leave immediately and to resettle in distant territories, Iraqi Christians spend quite long "temporary" periods in Istanbul. Often unable to obtain refugee status, most of them use the family unification programs of Australia and Canada. If they have sufficient economic resources, they opt for irregular methods of entry into Western soil. In the absence of sound refugee protection programs, they are forced to reestablish and rely upon primordial ties, such as familial and religious affiliations, as survival mechanisms.

The story of Jaclyn highlights the importance of these informal networks to survival and the realization of the final migration step. She had come from Mosul in 1999 when she was 32, together with her husband and two young children. In late 2003, she was living alone with her children in a ruined residence owned by the Syriac Church Foundation. Her

husband, disappointed and weary of waiting in Istanbul, had left clandestinely for Denmark where he was eventually regularized and began to work in a local church. Jaclyn's life in Istanbul was not totally isolated, though: she was supported by the Iraqi Christian community, consisting of a few thousand families who similarly considered Turkey a transit stop in their long emigration journey. For Jaclyn, as for many others, the central place of life in Istanbul was the church that provided social space and "a chance to gather freely with other Iraqis." After spending three years in Istanbul, during which her husband had tried in vain through legal channels to unify the family, Jaclyn and her two children reached Europe after having paid more than $10,000 to smugglers.

The social networks have two consequences for Iraqi Christian transit migrants in Istanbul: they facilitate their survival in the precarious transit period and reinforce communitarian bonds and structures. Far from facilitating the reconstruction of a collective belonging around an overarching Iraqi affiliation, obligatory flight and transit migration have boosted ethno-religious demarcations among Iraqis. In sum, "the peace and democracy project" ends in the re-communitarization of the Iraqis and thus unfastens the national unity that the Western allies aimed to restore.

In the absence of sound refugee protection programs, they are forced to reestablish and rely upon primordial ties, such as familial and religious affiliations, as survival mechanisms.

Palestinian Refugees from Iraq in Critical Need of Protection

Elizabeth H. Campbell

"The twice-displaced Palestinian refugees are one of the worst-off groups in a country full of desperate people. … They have no country to go to, no valid travel documents, no protectors inside Iraq, and hardly anyone prepared to support them outside either. … It is to everyone's dishonor that these human beings are still rotting [in border camps] and — worst of all — in Baghdad where one or more is being murdered virtually every day."[1]

Elizabeth Campbell, PhD, is currently the Director of Refugee Council USA. The views expressed in this essay belong solely to the author and should not be attributed to the organization.

Since the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Palestinian refugee community in Iraq has become increasing vulnerable and targeted by a variety of groups, including Iraqi security forces.[2] Palestinians have been forcibly evicted, arbitrarily arrested, abusively detained, publicly slandered, kidnapped, tortured, and killed.[3] Thus, many have been forced to flee this targeted persecution in search of asylum.

Of the estimated 34,000 Palestinian refugees living in Baghdad before 2003, today there are only 9,000 registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[4] More than 3,000 are living in desert camps near the Syrian border. Several thousand more have dispersed throughout the world in search of protection and are concentrated in places like New Delhi, Cyprus, and Malaysia.

With a few notable exceptions, the international community has largely failed to respond to the grave protection needs of these people. Traditional resettlement countries, including the United States, need to urgently consider admitting these refugees through their programs, designed and developed to save lives and respond to humanitarian needs.

Palestinian refugees, the world's largest and longest standing refugee population, came to Iraq in three waves — 1948, 1967, and 1991 — after being uprooted by three differ-

1. Rupert Colville, "How the World has turned its Back on the Palestinian Refugees in Iraq," *Refugees*, No. 146, Issue 2 (2007), p. 24.
2. UNHCR, "UNHCR Deeply Disturbed by Iraqi Security Forces Raid in Palestinian Area," UNHCR Briefing Notes, March 16, 2007.
3. UNHCR, "Palestinians from Iraq," *Iraq Situation Update*, April-May, 2008; Amnesty International, *Iraq: Human Rights Abuses against Palestinian Refugees*, AI Index: MDE 14/030/2007.
4. Andrew Harper, *UNHCR Annual Consultations with NGOs*, Director, Iraq Desk, UNHCR, Geneva, June 30, 2008.

ent wars. The majority of Palestinians in Iraq are 1948 refugees who originate from villages near Haifa and the Galilee.[5] They continue to have strong ties with their relatives in the West Bank and inside Israel. Iraq is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, nor does the UN Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) have a mandate to operate there. Under the former Iraqi government, Palestinians were provided protection under resolutions by the League of Arab States and by the 1965 Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States, otherwise known as the Casablanca Protocol. Palestinians were permitted to work, attend educational institutions, and enjoyed freedom of movement; however, they could not own property or acquire citizenship.

Despite their long-term residence in Iraq and their status as refugees, Palestinians have been afforded little protection in the aftermath of the US-led invasion. Without security of residence, Palestinians continue to be subjected to repeated expulsion and dispossession. Palestinian refugee families have suffered multiple displacements due to their lack of access to a nationality or citizenship.[6] Almost every decade since 1948 has brought a mass expulsion of Palestinians from one state or another — and this decade has been no different.

Despite their vulnerability and great need, and unlike hundreds of thousands of other refugees from Iraq, Palestinians attempting to seek asylum largely have been denied entry, especially to urban centers.

Given the hostile conditions facing this group, many Palestinians sought safety in neighboring countries. Despite their vulnerability and great need, and unlike hundreds of thousands of other refugees from Iraq, Palestinians attempting to seek asylum largely have been denied entry, especially to urban centers. Jordan refused to allow Palestinians to enter its territory, except for a limited number of approximately 400 who were married to Jordanian nationals. More than 150 others were confined to Ruwayshid camp, administered by UNHCR approximately 50 kilometers from the Iraq border.[7] After more than four years of confinement in this dusty and scorpion-infested camp, without freedom of movement and completely dependent upon aid, the majority of Palestinians were offered third country resettlement by Canada, New Zealand, and Brazil. The United States accepted eight cases. Those not resettled were transferred to al-Hul, a border camp in Syria. Still, the protection space in Jordan for Palestinians remains closed.

Three additional camps near the Syrian-Iraqi borders also house Palestinians from Iraq who have been denied entry into Syria. As of July 2008, al-Hul camp, located in al-Hassakah Governorate in northeast Syria, has 296 Palestinian residents. Al-Walid camp is inside Iraq near the Syrian border and hosts 2,000 Palestinians. The unbearable conditions include extreme temperatures, the presence of snakes and scorpions, and serious protection issues including armed

5. Badil, "Searching for Solutions for Palestinian Refugees Stuck in and Fleeing Iraq," *Al-Majdal*, No. 33 (2007).
6. Susan Akram, "Myths and Realities of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Reframing the Right of Return," *MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies (Spring 2008), p. 183.*
7. UNHCR, "Iraq: More Palestinians Leave Iraq for Border." UNHCR Briefing Notes, April 4, 2006.

non-residents reportedly entering the camp. One aid worker who has visited the camp described it as "hell."[8] Al-Tanf camp, located beside the main transit road and in the no-man's land between the Iraqi and Syrian checkpoints, has 726 Palestinian refugees. Refugees live in tents, and water, food, and fuel must be trucked into the camp. Despite these extreme and dangerous conditions, the population of al-Tanf continues to increase. Some 500 Palestinians who entered Syria clandestinely with forged Iraqi passports have been picked up by Syrian authorities and deported to the camp. An estimated 3,000 Palestinians from Iraq continue to reside in Syria, many of whom have been welcomed into the existing Palestinian refugee communities.

Chile and Sweden recently sent missions to al-Tanf and will resettle approximately 100 and 150 refugees respectively. Iceland sent a mission to al-Walid, and is expected to resettle around 30 Palestinians. At the recent June 30-July 2, 2008 Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement in Geneva, Sweden and Iceland both emphasized the strong protection needs of these refugees.[9]

Approximately six months ago, the government of Sudan, members of the Palestinian Authority, and UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement to relocate refugees from al-Walid camp. The agreement offers refugees the opportunity to be relocated to Khartoum on a voluntary basis. Only those refugees able to become self-sufficient would be considered. Pre-fabricated housing would be made available. These refugees would be entitled to two years of UNHCR oversight, after which they would receive no assistance. Refugees would be given a residency permit but not citizenship or a passport. Since Palestinians will not enjoy security of residence, they may once again be subjected to expulsion and dispossession. In this sense, the solution is far from durable.

...many more resettlement countries, including the United States, need to urgently prioritize the examination of these cases for admission.

UNHCR has consistently appealed to refugee resettlement countries to respond to the dire needs of the families trapped in these inhumane conditions.[10] US-based non-governmental organizations also have highlighted this need.[11] Still, many more resettlement countries, including the United States, need to urgently prioritize the examination of these cases for admission. This should continue until the Palestinian refugee issue writ large is addressed within the framework of UN resolutions and international law as part of a durable, long-term solution to peace in the Middle East.

8. Amnesty International, "Rhetoric and Reality: the Iraqi Refugee Crisis," MDE 14/011/2008.
9. Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, 2008 (UNHCR Report forthcoming).
10. See UNHCR for complete list, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=pse&expand=news.
11. See NGO Advocacy Letter, May 2008, http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=rcusa-advocacy-letters-and-documents; Bill Frelick, "Nowhere to Flee: The Perilous Situation of Palestinians in Iraq," *Human Rights Watch,* September 2006; and *Refugees International*, March 2008, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/ detail/10508.

III

Internally Displaced Persons: Status and Future

Iraq's Internally Displaced Persons: Scale, Plight, and Prospects

Dana Graber Ladek

Over the past several decades and especially in the past two years, Iraq has suffered from one of the worst displacement crises in the world.

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While new displacement has slowed to a trickle in 2008, the conditions of those already displaced continue to deteriorate, and prospects for those returning to their homes are grim. The plight of internally displaced Iraqis and those who have crossed international borders in search of refuge remains largely unknown and unaddressed.

IRAQ SUFFERS FROM A HISTORY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT

During Saddam's reign, Iraqis were expelled from their homes (as part of Saddam's Arabization campaign), fled fighting in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, were forced to find new livelihoods and homes due to the draining of the marshlands in the south, escaped violence due to the suppression of the 1991 uprising against Saddam's government, and fled due to human rights abuses (such as the al-Anfal campaign).

Following the overthrow of Saddam's government, Iraqis continued to be displaced due to military operations and, increasingly, sectarian violence, lawlessness, and general crime.

More than 2.8 million people remain displaced within Iraq, with an additional 2–2.5 million having fled to neighboring countries, primarily Jordan and Syria. While substantial attention has been paid to Iraqi refugees, those who were forced to flee but have stayed within the borders of Iraq — known as internally displaced persons (IDPs) — are often overlooked. Iraqis who were not able to leave the country are frequently the worst off; they did not have the financial ability or international connections that would have allowed them to leave the country and thus had to seek refuge within the country's borders.

Almost 1.6 million of the 2.8 million displaced within Iraq fled in the past two years. The majority report fleeing due to direct threats to their lives, which often take the form of death threats, such as letters, pamphlets, or mobile phone text messages warning them to leave or risk death. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has assessed more than one million of these recently displaced in order to better understand

their conditions and needs.

Iraqis tended to flee from mixed communities, especially in Baghdad (the place of origin for almost 65% of IDPs), to areas of the same religion and sect. Many Shi'a Muslims fled the central provinces/governorates to the Shi'a-dominated south; Sunni Muslims fled mixed communities in the south and center to Sunni communities in the center and north; and small percentages of religious and ethnic minorities, such as Christians, Yazidis, and Turkmens, fled to small minority enclaves or left the country altogether.

THE CONDITIONS FOR MANY DISPLACED WITHIN IRAQ ARE GRIM

The majority of Iraqi IDPs (66% of those assessed by IOM) are unemployed and without the means to cover basic needs such as rent, household goods, health care, rising fuel costs, and even food. Some who are less fortunate must find shelter in abandoned buildings or build makeshift housing on public land, facing the constant threat of eviction. These "homes" tend to be overcrowded and lack basic services such as running water, electricity, or sanitation facilities.

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Many Iraqis rely on the government's monthly Public Distribution System (PDS) food rations. However, once they flee their homes, their food ration card is no longer valid until they officially transfer the registration. This requires returning to their place of origin, which is impossible for people fleeing violence and conflict. Only 29% of IDPs report regular access to these food rations, and only 41% report receiving food assistance from another source.

Probably one of the hardest hit sectors of Iraq's services over the past decade is the health care system. The exodus of healthcare professionals that has occurred since the 2003 invasion, a severe shortage of medicine and equipment, and damage to medical facilities have left the current healthcare system crippled at best. This only exacerbates poor living conditions for IDPs, who often dwell in unsanitary conditions. A lack of access to quality healthcare increases the spread of disease and deterioration of chronic health conditions. Fourteen percent of interviewed IDPs report that they have no access to healthcare services, and 30% report that they cannot access the medicines they require. Specialized health assistance such as gynecology or surgical care is also difficult for all Iraqis to acquire.

Water shortages and lack of access to clean water also negatively affect IDPs' health and living conditions. IDPs increasingly draw water from drainage canals, broken pipes, or polluted streams. As a result, more and more IDP children suffer from intestinal and skin diseases. Twenty percent of interviewed IDPs do not have regular access to water, a number which is likely to increase with the periods of drought affecting Iraq this year, especially in the north.

IDP children are the most vulnerable and significantly affected by displacement. In addition to suffering from substandard living, improper nutrition, and lack of access to appropriate healthcare, IDP children often exhibit psychosocial scars due to witnessing the acts of violence that led to their families' displacement. A lack of psychosocial care throughout the country means that IDP children must internalize the trauma of their flight and the hardships of their living conditions. In addition, when asked if all of their children were able to attend school, only 18% of assessed IDP families responded affirmatively. Lack of money and the need for children to work were the most frequently provided reasons for non-attendance.

Sixty percent of interviewed IDPs report that they would like to return home. Due to deplorable living conditions, in addition to improved security throughout Iraq and the condition of illegal living status for Iraqis who fled the country, more and more IDPs and refugees are returning home. However, in some cases returnees cannot come back to their original homes. In some neighborhoods and cities, homes were destroyed or are currently occupied, while other areas are still unsafe. In fact, over 25% of IDPs report that another citizen is currently occupying their home, and over 15% report that their property has been destroyed.

Once they do return, Iraqis sometimes face the same conditions at home as they did in their places of displacement. Of those returnees who have been assessed by IOM (more than 9,000 individuals), less than 45% of male heads of household and 3% of female heads of household are employed. Only 59% report that their home is accessible and in good condition, and only 36% report regular access to PDS food rations. Clearly, conditions upon return are barely an improvement from those in areas of displacement.

Although fewer and fewer people in Iraq are fleeing their homes and an increasing number are beginning to return, the situation in the country for many of the internally displaced and returnees remains dismal.

Although fewer and fewer people in Iraq are fleeing their homes and an increasing number are beginning to return, the situation in the country for many of the internally displaced and returnees remains dismal. While there is a clear need for humanitarian assistance, donor funding to help these populations is decreasing. At a time when Iraqis need it most, the international community should increase its awareness of the situation and provide assistance in order to avoid the further deterioration of conditions for these vulnerable populations.

From Exile to Peril at Home: Returned Refugees and Iraq's Displacement Crisis

Joseph Logan

In the last months of 2007, tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees left Syria to return to their country. Whether they returned in Iraqi government-sponsored bus convoys or on individual journeys, some in Baghdad and Washington touted their move as a sign of success in bringing order to Baghdad and a vote of confidence by the returnees in Iraq's safety and stability. Elsewhere, governments like Jordan and Sweden that had provided sanctuary to Iraqi refugees may have seen in the returns a signal that the time had come to begin compelling Iraqis to return, rather than providing them with asylum and assistance.

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Yet in nearly all cases, the Iraqis who returned from Syria were, in effect, fleeing for a second time: this time from pressure that their reluctant host country brought to bear by tightening residence requirements, and under the burden of supporting themselves in Syria with little chance of employment and dwindling savings. Those who returned to Baghdad found a city carved into sectarian enclaves. Armed groups — some with a presence in Iraqi security forces, others erstwhile enemies and present allies of the US military — have redrawn the human map of the city. The violence in Iraq that spurred flight to Syria is down, but security arrangements intended to prevent its recurrence are tenuous and are staked on a project of political reconciliation whose success is uncertain.

In February 2008, Human Rights Watch conducted interviews with 33 Iraqis who had returned from Syria to Baghdad in the last months of 2007. Their stories link two scenes of Iraq's tragedy of flight: refuge abroad from the threat of sectarian violence and displacement at home with neither safety nor basic humanitarian needs assured. These stories also underline the need to address the crisis of refugees and the internally displaced — who together now comprise some 4.7 million Iraqis — as a matter of humanitarian and political urgency, rather than ignoring it as politically inconvenient in the narrative of a newly stable Iraq.

The returnees interviewed by Human Rights Watch resided in 18 separate areas of Baghdad; the majority had returned from Damascus and its outskirts within the previous several months. All but one respondent cited one or both of two principal reasons for returning: the effective ban on legal employment for Iraqis in Syria and a stricter

residency regime introduced last year, when the number of Iraqis had swelled to as many as 1.5 million.

In early 2007, Syria, which has traditionally admitted nationals of Arab countries without visas, briefly stopped issuing the three-month entry permits that it had granted to Iraqis and replaced them with a document that could only be renewed after leaving the country. In October 2007, Syria began requiring Iraqis to enter with a visa granted for specific purposes such as education or commerce.

Nearly all of the returnees who spoke to Human Rights Watch attributed the decision to flee Iraq in the first place to the surge of sectarian violence that had swept Baghdad following the attack on a Shi'a shrine in Samarra in February 2006.

Firas, 37, a Sunni, fled to Syria in 2006 from a neighborhood that became heavily populated with Shi'ites who were themselves fleeing Sunni militias in an adjacent district. The demographic transformation of the area and the presence of sectarian militias left men of the opposing confessional group particularly threatened. "My brother and I left after the Shi'a militias took control of the area," he said. "We are Sunnis. A month after we left, my father, mother, wife, and child were all driven out."

The violence in Iraq that spurred flight to Syria is down, but security arrangements intended to prevent its recurrence are tenuous and are staked on a project of political reconciliation whose success is uncertain.

Husayn, a pensioner in his fifties who, along with his wife and six children, returned from Syria in December 2007 and now lives in a western Baghdad neighborhood, described the logic of his path from a predominantly Sunni part of that district to Syria, then back and across a new internal border. "I rented in a Shi'a neighborhood, closer to Shu'la (a Shi'a area) because I'm Shi'a, and it was the safest thing," he said.

Like most of the displaced in Baghdad, Husayn sought safety through residence in a homogenous area, but said even that safety was relative and fragile: "There isn't anywhere completely safe in Iraq," he said, "and here on the 'border' we're between the Shi'a militia and the Sunni armed group."

The majority of returnees assumed displaced status after finding their homes destroyed or occupied by others. Ali, 47, fled a mixed southern Baghdad neighborhood where warring militias targeted members of the group associated with their opponents in January 2007, moving with his wife and two children to Syria. They returned seven months later, renting in a predominantly Shi'a area.

"We left after I was directly threatened by al-Qa'ida, which took control of some of Saydiyya a bit at a time until they reached our area. I found an envelope in the house containing a bullet and a threatening letter," he said. "I feel safer

now, but I'm still slightly afraid of the snipers who target the area because it's Shi'a ... I can't even think of going back; there's someone from al-Qa'ida living in my house now, and he's joined up with the *Sahwa* [the US-funded Awakening groups]."

The phenomenon of return appears to have been short-lived; by May of this year, UNHCR estimated that only slightly more Iraqis entered Syria each day than left for Iraq. But the prospect holds obvious appeal for the US and Iraqi governments: at a conference on Iraqi reconstruction in May, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stressed the importance of refugee returns. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, whose government organized some returns from Syria in 2007 with the lure of cash, spoke of future incentives to bring refugees back.

The accounts of the Syria returnees make it clear that conditions that would justify a call for returns are not in place. "Push" remains stronger than "pull;" Iraq remains incredibly violent by any standard other than one based on the carnage of its recent past, and no structure exists to meet the humanitarian needs of the current displaced population.

The accounts of the Syria returnees make it clear that conditions that would justify a call for returns are not in place. "Push" remains stronger than "pull"...

Until those conditions take hold, Iraq's neighbors should refrain from forcibly repatriating refugees. Other countries, such as the United States — which has admitted only symbolic numbers of refugees despite its particular responsibility for their crisis — should admit substantially more refugees and increase financial support to Syria, Jordan, and other countries that have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis. And Iraq's own government should start tending to the displaced population it has and has done little to protect or assist, rather than making political gestures on the subject — and at the expense — of refugees.

Kirkuk: Constitutional Promises Unfulfilled

David Romano

Many people view Kirkuk as a microcosm of all of Iraq. The ancient city counts among its inhabitants significant numbers of almost all of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups — Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Sunnis, and Shi'ites. The last semi-reliable census of Kirkuk's population, from 1957, indicated a slight majority of Turkmen in Kirkuk City and a majority of Kurds, followed by Arabs, in the province as a whole.

1957 Kirkuk Census Figures[1]



Kirkuk province (officially al-Ta'mim Governorate) also contains around one-third of Iraq's known oil deposits, which makes the area a geostrategic concern for actors otherwise far removed from Kirkuk's inhabitants. In an effort to solidify Arab control over this oil-rich multi-ethnic region, the Iraqi Ba'thists began pursuing Arabization policies in Kirkuk and the surrounding areas in 1968, culminating in mass deportations and ethnic cleansing in the late 1970s, 80s, and 90s. In 1970, competing claims over Kirkuk also

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1. Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, eds., *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p. 83. McGarry and O'Leary add the following observation about Kirkuk's demographics: "The most objective summation of the 1957 demography is that Kirkuk was a multi-ethnic city surrounded by a larger and heavily Kurdish population in the governorate. What the situation is in 2004 no one knows for certain. All the populations have probably grown in size, but Kurds and Arabs have likely had higher birth rates than Turkmen and Assyrians, although it is a fool's game to project demographic data from fifty years ago" O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih, eds., *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq,* p. 83.

played an important role in scuttling a peace and autonomy agreement between Kurdish rebels and the government in Baghdad, since neither side appeared willing to relinquish the area. In the years following the crushing of the 1975 Kurdish insurgency, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people were expelled from Kirkuk Governorate. Most of the deportees were Kurds, but many Turkmen and Christians also were expelled. The majority of the deportees ended up in the governorates of Sulaymaniyya and Erbil, which since 1991 have formed a large part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region.

Now that the Ba'thist regime in Iraq has been overthrown, the question of how to resolve the injustice of forced displacement and correct the ethnic cleansing of the previous regime has emerged front and center. Many fear that a sectarian contest over Kirkuk could draw all of Iraq into the fray. Some 200,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) already have returned to Kirkuk, sometimes due to a certain amount of pressure from Kurdish leaders anxious to strengthen Kurdish claims on the area. Most of the returnees are Kurdish, poor, and unemployed, given that IDPs who made good in cities such as Sulaymaniyya and Erbil remain much less inclined to leave everything and return to an uncertain future in Kirkuk. Although a property restitution system — the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD), formerly the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) — was established to deal with property disputes between IDPs and settlers (mostly poor Shi'ite Arabs that Saddam brought in from the south) and has done some good work recently, most of the returnees may not qualify for property restitution, given that they did not own property at the time of their expulsion. Nonetheless, returning Kurdish IDPs have high expectations that they will be given jobs and homes and that Kirkuk will become part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Most of them feel that only by being part of the Kurdish region will their security be assured.

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Wisely, the Iraqi government has begun encouraging Arab settlers (who should not be confused with Kirkuk's indigenous Arab population) to return south, providing them with a number of incentives. However, some settlers, especially the second and third generation children of settlers, as well as the many families that experienced intermarriage between settlers and indigenous Kirkukis, will not want to leave, and even Kurdish leaders have not suggested any plans to force them to do so.

Despite the positive effect of property restitution and resettlement with good incentives and compensation, a number of daunting problems continue to bedevil any resolution of the Kirkuk question. Although many indigenous Kirkuki Arabs could accept becoming part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region,[2] in general, Arabs fear that Kurds will use control of Kirkuk to lay claim to the oil of the area, refuse to turn over oil revenues to Baghdad, and use the financial windfall to separate from Iraq. Some Turkmen are also amenable to joining the Kurdish administration,[3] although the

2. This unscientific observation is based on my own conversations with Arabs from Kirkuk, held in 2003 and 2004.
3. Some areas already in the Kurdish Autonomous Region, such as Erbil, contain a sizable Turkmen population. Inter Press

most prominent Turkmen community spokespersons have expressed deep aversion to such a possibility. Turkmen may believe that their interests and rights can be better pursued in a more multi-ethnic Baghdadi political arena than as part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region, or they may be following suggestions from Ankara to oppose the expansion of the Kurdish Region's borders.

In an effort to avoid conflict over Kirkuk, a number of international observers and organizations have made several suggestions. In 2006, the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested making Kirkuk into its own federal region and waiting approximately ten years before trying to decide whether or not it would join the Kurdish region. More recently, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) proposed a kind of "grand bargain between elites" approach, wherein disputed territories throughout northern Iraq would be apportioned according to their demographics and whatever Iraqi leaders could negotiate between themselves. Both these proposals and others should be received as well-intentioned efforts to assist Iraqis in finding a political settlement and a final resolution for forced displacement problems around Kirkuk and similar areas. Unfortunately, few international organizations and observers have suggested ways of following the envisioned legal and constitutional formula for dealing with Kirkuk and its displaced population. There exists a real danger from reneging on constitutional promises, given that a constitution forms the very basis of a state's legitimacy and the willingness of its various communities to reside together under one political umbrella. While Iraq's constitution may contain provisions that favor Kurdish claims over Kirkuk, the Kurds obtained these provisions through a very difficult negotiation process that included concessions on other issues, such as an explicit role for Islam in Iraqi jurisprudence.

Despite the positive effect of property restitution and resettlement with good incentives and compensation, a number of daunting problems continue to bedevil any resolution of the Kirkuk question.

Discussion of displaced persons and return questions, especially with regard to the contested Kirkuk region, requires an understanding of the difficult process that led to the enactment of Iraq's first democratic and viable constitution. The 2005 Permanent Constitution contains a number of articles dealing specifically with displaced persons as well as the status of Kirkuk. Most importantly for the Kirkuk question, Article 140 of the Permanent Constitution (Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law) lays out a series of three steps to resolve the Kirkuk issue: 1) normalization, meaning the return of people forcibly displaced by Saddam's regime and the undoing of administrative border changes ("gerrymandering") that the Ba'th enacted in order to increase the Arab proportion of Kirkuk's population; 2) a census; and 3) a referendum to determine if Kirkuk should become part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region.

Service News Agency also carried the following statement in one of its recent articles: "Turkey claims it acts to protect the Turkomen community in Kirkuk, but not all Turkmens welcome its intervention. Turkomen leader Irfan Kirkuli says Turkomens will be better off joining a Kurdish autonomous area. He also warned against interference by outside powers, saying 'they aim to create turmoil and tension in Kirkuk.'" Mohammed A. Salih, "Iraq: Kirkuk Fearful of Future," Inter Press Service News Agency, September 30, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34949 .

The constitutionally mandated deadline for holding a referendum on Kirkuk was December 31, 2007. When it became clear that even a census, much less a referendum, would not be held by that date, the Iraqi Parliament extended the deadline by six months. The new deadline of July 2008 seems certain to be missed as well. New plans to address the Kirkuk issue, including suggestions from organizations like the ICG and UNAMI, should try to incorporate the three steps promised in the constitution, lest the whole post-Saddam national pact unravel. It also might be reasonable to assume that most Kirkukis want the constitutional program to be adhered to, given that 63% of Kirkuk's population voted in favor of the constitution in 2005.[4]

Discussion of displaced persons and return questions, especially with regard to the contested Kirkuk region, requires an understanding of the difficult process that led to the enactment of Iraq's first democratic and viable constitution.

4. For a lengthier discussion of the Kirkuk issue and possible resolutions, please see David Romano, "The Future of Kirkuk." *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 6, No.2 (2007), pp.1-19.

IV

Return, Relief, and Redress?

Brain Drain and Return

Joseph Sassoon

Brain drain from Iraq threatens not only the economic prospects of the country, but also has serious implications for the consolidation of democracy and for the health care, justice, and education sectors. During Saddam's era, a first wave of brain drain in the aftermath of the 1968 *coup d'ětat* was followed by a second and larger wave after the first Gulf War of 1991. This was the beginning of the unravelling of the fabric of Iraq's society and its middle class in particular. By 2003, estimates of Iraqi exiles ranged from two to four million people, and since the US-led invasion, the country has not witnessed the return of these millions but instead the loss of more professionals, academics, and artists, who are mostly from the middle class.

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The optimism that spread among the educated and professionals following the collapse of Saddam's regime was short-lived. Doctors and academics who were even remotely associated with the Ba'th party were targeted after they lost their jobs. The targeting soon expanded beyond those affiliated with the previous regime and a combination of militias and criminal gangs began killing or kidnapping professionals (particularly doctors, lawyers, and academics). Unlike in Saddam's era when doctors and academics left Iraq because they were individual victims of the regime, in post-2003 Iraq they became targeted as a group.

Apart from violence and ethnic cleansing, there were other factors that pushed these professionals into exile following the 2003 invasion. First, unemployment among the young and educated was high and reached levels of 35-40%.[1] Many professionals and artists were forced to take menial jobs to support themselves. The fact that Iraq today combines a centralized bureaucracy with corrupt practices and is dominated by nepotism and cronyism exacerbated the situation for all professionals. Second, religion has increasingly encroached on intellectual and academic life. Religious militias now have significant influence on the academic campuses of central and southern Iraq. Artists complain that the Ba'thist official censorship has been replaced by new prohibitive religious codes of conduct.

Although there are no accurate statistics on the number of Iraqi academics and doctors who fled the country, one rough estimate suggested that there are 1,500 Iraqi academics living in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Presumably a number have also gone further afield.

1. The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx.

Estimates of the number of doctors who have left Iraq since 2003 vary widely, ranging from 3,000 to 17,000. What is clear, however, is that Iraq lost a large percentage of its specialists (some say 70%) and probably 25-35% of its overall medical staff. These are massive numbers considering that the majority of the exodus occurred over just 18 months. With the departure of its professional elite, Iraq lost hundreds of years worth of experience.

Data about academics and professionals who were assassinated is more accurate. The *Brussels Tribunal* compiled a list of 350 names of those professionals (the vast majority being PhD holders) who were murdered.[2] The Iraqi Lawyers Association published a list of 210 lawyers and judges killed since the invasion and said that the number of lawyers in Iraq has decreased by 40% since the invasion.

The implications of this brain drain are reflected in Iraq's daily life: its health care system (among the best in the region until the 1980s) has crumbled and estimates indicate that almost 70% of critically injured people die in emergency rooms because of shortages of medical staff and essential supplies;[3] the educational infrastructure has weakened significantly and education levels have dropped precipitously; and finally, the bureaucratic machine of the government has deteriorated to the extent that it is affecting the execution of any capital or investment budget. Iraq lost the bulk of its educated middle class, which will reduce its chances of having a stable democracy in the long run. Indeed it is ironic that the US came to Iraq with the intent of establishing democracy, only to see the biggest proponent of democracy, the middle class, flee the country, and thereby ceding more control to the religious groups.

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If violence comes to a halt or ebbs, would these professionals return to their country? It is doubtful that many of those who managed to get to the West (usually specialists and members of the different minorities) will return to Iraq. For those in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, the situation is somewhat complicated. Many of these professionals have not managed to get jobs commensurate with their qualifications, and a large number are frustrated with their professional lives. But even for these, a number of basic conditions must be in place before large numbers head home. Apart from a reduction or cessation of violence, ethnic divisions and sectarianism have to contract significantly from daily life. Those in exile will consider employment opportunities and would need to be confident that jobs and opportunities would be allocated on the basis of merit rather than according to affiliation to the right party and clan. Other considerations would include access to essential services (water, electricity, etc.) and quality of education for their children. Another critical factor is property rights and the ability to return home. Needless to say, this assumes that the refugees will return due to "pull" factors in Iraq rather than "push" factors in their refugee countries.

2."List of Killed, Threatened, or Kidnapped Iraqi Academics," *Brussels Tribunal*, www.brusselstribunal.org/academicsList.htm.

3. John Zarocastas, "Exodus of Medical Staff Strains Iraq's Health Facilities," *British Medical Journal*, Issue 334 (April 28, 2007), p. 865.

History teaches us that with protracted exile, the chances of return reduce over time as the world of refugees is reshaped socially and economically. Children, who are more adaptive and quick to embrace their new society, abhor the thought of return and act as a restraining factor. Women also may be reluctant to return, as they tend to focus on access to health care and education for their families and are often deterred by religious dogma and the associated erosion of women's rights.

In mid-2008, conditions are not conducive to the return of large numbers of refugees. Both UNHCR and Amnesty International believe that the criteria for safe return are not met by the situation in Iraq today. Even if and when they are met, the government will need to give serious thought and action to issues such as housing, property restitution, health, and education before refugees will be keen to return.

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Alternative Scenarios for Iraq's Displaced

Elizabeth Ferris

Most of those writing about future scenarios for Iraq rarely mention the fate of the five million displaced Iraqis, but when they do, they seem to assume that once security and political progress in Iraq are achieved, the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) will return to their communities and life will go on. Unfortunately, even in the best of political scenarios, it is unlikely to be so straightforward. The lessons learned from recent returns of Iraqis to their communities — though the number is very small, less than 1% of displaced Iraqis — provide an inkling of what is likely to come if conditions in Iraq improve.

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From September-November 2007, there were enthusiastic reports that refugees were returning from Syria to Baghdad.[1] The Iraqi government and coalition forces interpreted this as evidence that the "surge" was successful and that security was improving. The Baghdad government organized a convoy of buses to bring the Iraqis home, offered those returning to Baghdad an $800 cash incentive, and heralded the returns as the beginning of a new era. But the government soon backtracked and suggested that the Iraqis not come home until later, the $800 inducement was dropped, and no further bus convoys were organized. Since then, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) consistently has refused to recommend that Iraqis return to Iraq. While there have been some modest refugee returns and larger numbers of IDPs returning to their communities in 2008, the numbers are still small.[2]

But the little we know about the returns raises troubling possibilities of what is to come. Even in the positive scenario that improvements in security continue and political progress is made, many concerns arise. First, indications are that most of the refugees who have returned so far have done so because of economic hardship and visa restrictions in Syria. The "push" factor seems stronger than the "pull" factor. Secondly, virtually all of the return movements have been to areas that have become ethnically/religiously homogeneous. Returnees move primarily to those neighborhoods under the control of members of their sect. Only a few families have returned to areas under the control of

1. See for example, Albert Aji, "Buses bring hundreds of Iraqis home," *The Washington Post*, November 27, 2007.

2. UNHCR estimates returns during the second half of 2007 and the first three months of 2008 to stand at 50,000 refugee returns and 60,000 IDP returns. UNHCR projects that overall in 2008, there will be 100,000 newly displaced, 100,000 refugee returns, and 120,000 IDP returns. UNHCR, "Progress on Mainstreaming IDP issues in UNHCR and Global Work Plan for IDP Operations," EC/59/SC/CRP.16 (June 2008), p. 23.

another sect. In its 2007 survey, UNHCR found no members of minority groups (Christians, Sabaean-Mandeans, or Yazidis) who had returned.[3] Moreover, there are few mixed neighborhoods to which Iraqis can return. This seems to suggest that future patterns of Iraqi returns will bolster sectarian separation, reinforcing the trends of the weakening of religious pluralism in Iraq and the rise of a society where sectarian identity competes with national identity.

A third troubling aspect of the returns thus far is the specter of conflicts over housing, land, and property. An estimated 70% of returning refugees and 55% of returning IDPs have found their property destroyed, damaged, or occupied by others.[4] As I have previously argued,[5] the issue of property claims could well be a ticking time bomb, which could renew conflicts. Furthermore, the need to establish mechanisms to resolve property disputes and to enforce those decisions for hundreds of thousands — possibly millions — of claims will be a major undertaking.

A fourth troubling aspect of the returns thus far is the message they have given to European governments hosting Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers. European governments — most notably Sweden and the United Kingdom — have announced that they will begin returning Iraqis whose claims for asylum have been denied.[6] There is also concern that the return of a limited number of Iraqi refugees could shift attention away from the ongoing needs of Iraqis living in neighboring countries. If donor governments were to perceive that the refugee problem is over because people are going back, they would be less likely to fund humanitarian programs for Iraqi refugees in Iraq's neighboring countries. There is evidence that this year — for the first time in the last few years — UNHCR is facing difficulties in getting the necessary support for its Iraqi programs. If refugees do not receive the necessary assistance in exile, the pressure will increase on them to return before conditions are conducive to repatriation, which could well put additional burdens on a still very fragile state.[7]

If the returns were to occur suddenly, there would be a risk of further instability...

In the best case, the level of violence in Iraq will decrease, political institutions will function more effectively, security will improve, and international organizations will provide greater humanitarian assistance inside Iraq. In this case, refugees and particularly IDPs will try to return. However, it is likely — and indeed desirable — that returns take place over several years. If the returns were to occur suddenly, there would be a risk of further instability as a result of overwhelmingly inadequate infrastructure and the prospect of simultaneously dealing with a large number of property disputes.

3. UNHCR, *UNHCR Second Rapid Assessment of Return of Iraqis from Displacement Locations in Iraq and from Neighbouring Countries,* March 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SHIG-7CEDPJ?OpenDocument.
4. Julien Barnes-Dacey and Sam Dagher, "Returning from Syria, Iraqis question safety," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 28, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1128/p06s01-wome.htm; IOM, Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments, IOM/MoDM, Baghdad, January 2008
5. Elizabeth G. Ferris, "The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq," Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper, July 2008.
6. Alan Travis, "Iraqi asylum seekers given deadline to go home or face destitution in UK," *The Guardian,* March 13, 2008, p. 4.
7. Peter Grier, "How will the Iraq war end?" *Christian Science Monitor*, March 13, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0318/p01s05-woiq.html.

A basic principle of durable solutions for both refugees and IDPs is that decisions to return must be voluntary, which means that IDPs must have a choice between alternatives. The question of alternative solutions is particularly important for refugees who are unlikely to be able to return to Iraq, including minorities, female-headed households, and serious medical cases. Support for host governments to allow these groups to integrate locally would thus be important.[8] In addition, this should be complemented by a robust resettlement program to the US, which would demonstrate a shared commitment to finding solutions for the refugees. For IDPs, the option of settling in another part of the country should be provided.

While improved security is key to the return of refugees and IDPs, it is important to underscore the need for good governance in planning for sustainable returns. Even if violence decreases, if people cannot receive their food rations or find a job, if there are no doctors or functioning schools, if they do not trust the local police, if they cannot get compensation for property now occupied by others, they will not return. If they are forced to return, they could well be a further de-stabilizing force. Present trends indicate that security is improving and that progress is being made on the political front. If these trends continue, refugees and IDPs will return. However, according to a recent survey, a majority of those displaced indicated that they plan to stay where they are, and only 17% indicated that they plan to return to their community of origin.[9]

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If the security situation does not continue to improve, then the prospects for Iraq's refugees and internally displaced are grim indeed. A deteriorating situation in Iraq could result from a change in loyalties of *Sahwa* (also called "Awakening") groups, the ending of the al-Sadr ceasefire, or increasing intra-Shi'a violence. If sectarian and other violence worsens, if power devolves to local militias, if there is little political process, the already fragile infrastructure is further damaged, and displacement increases, then large-scale voluntary returns are unlikely. In fact, it is probable that many of those who are displaced within the country may try to move to other countries. However, they are unlikely to find a positive reception by host governments already concerned about the impact of the large numbers of Iraqi refugees.

8. For example, of the 204,000 Iraqis registered in Syria, 11% were found to have experienced torture or violence in Iraq, and around 15% were found to have a serious medical condition. UNHCR, "Syria Update," May 2008.
9. UNHCR, IOM, UNOPS, MoDM, KRG, "Socio-economic Conditions of Internally Displaced Persons and Their Intentions," 2008.

Iraq's Displaced at the Crossroads of Partition and Restitution

Rhodri C. Williams

In the aftermath of the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra, the ethnic violence and displacement that engulfed Iraq drew heavy media attention and triggered a heated debate in US policy circles over whether the country should be partitioned among its fractious ethnic and confessional groups. For observers in the US, partition was most often seen as a way of ending the bloodshed in Iraq in a sustainable manner. As a result, the debate over partition largely subsided along with the levels of violence over the course of 2007.

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However, for the Iraqis, questions of partition have probably never been as relevant as now. The government has signaled its opposition to sectarian partition by initiating policies to achieve the return of those displaced by the violence. However, levels of actual return have remained low due to a number of obstacles, including ongoing security concerns and the need to provide restitution of the homes and lands left behind by those who fled, many of which are now damaged, destroyed, or occupied by others. These challenges to reversing the demographic un-mixing of the country will be further exacerbated by a series of upcoming political debates that will distract political attention and resources further from refugee return, give rise to tension and insecurity, and which may well result in the consolidation of an Iraq consisting of powerful ethnic and sectarian regions.

Under these circumstances, there are grounds for concern that the humanitarian consequences of displacement and the rights of the displaced may simply fail to register. The recent violence in Iraq gave rise to the largest displacement crisis in the Middle East since the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. However, although those uprooted since 2003 in Iraq should benefit from rights to return and restitution that were less self-evident in 1948, they nevertheless remain at risk of being treated as pawns in a larger game of control over political constituencies and natural resources. If this turns out to be the case, their unresolved claims and grievances risk destabilizing Iraq and the region for decades to come.

A crucial ambiguity in the US partition debate is related to its definition. Partition most clearly refers to the division of a country into separate political units, with "hard" partition resulting in new states and "soft" partition resulting in greater autonomy for federal regions within an enduring state. However, a second element common to many

partitions is demographic separation, with the respective parties to partition agreeing or acquiescing to permanent exchanges of population that ensure that the new political boundaries are aligned with new ethnic or sectarian lines. Partition advocates in Iraq and other settings often emphasize this latter factor — ethnic separation — as a means of securing durable peace by moving vulnerable minorities out of harm's way.

However, there are grounds to question the efficacy of ethnic separation as a method of conflict resolution. Some of the most prominent past examples are marked by ongoing confrontation. For instance, the exchange of two million people between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s was followed by decades of open hostility culminating in the 1974 Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus. Ironically, the ongoing de facto partition of Cyprus remains the most serious obstacle to Turkey's current efforts at achieving regional stability through the new model of European integration. Meanwhile, the 1948 partition of India and Pakistan yielded one of the world's most perennially dangerous borders, with the parties having engaged in the first serious nuclear standoff since the Cold War just a few years ago.

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Equally important, changes to international law since the end of World War II mean that states no longer have the discretion to uproot people as simply as they might redraw administrative borders. The development of human rights law means that all people enjoy rights to properties and homes and freedoms to choose where they want to live that were not previously recognized. In displacement settings where these rights have been violated, the victims should in principle enjoy the right to freely return to their homes or to choose to live elsewhere, as well as the right to restitution of the property they left behind.

This new dynamic has been recognized in recent peace agreements such as those in Bosnia, where minority demands for collective security have been addressed through soft partition-style political measures such as decentralization and regional autonomy, while individuals have been accorded rights to claim and return to their homes regardless of who controls the area where they are located. In the wake of the recent violence, Iraq is taking similar steps as well. Iraq's Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, has declared that the country is now safe enough for all refugees to return to their homes and his government recently launched a national policy for addressing the plight of those displaced within Iraq, setting out clear rights to return and restitution. On paper, at least, the principle has been established that any demographic separation of Iraqis will take place on their own volition and without stripping them of the homes and assets they left behind.

Nevertheless, the challenges to realizing the rights of displaced Iraqis are daunting. The scale of displacement alone

is a serious challenge, with up to two million refugees outside Iraq and nearly three million displaced within the country. Many of the displaced are increasingly vulnerable and impoverished as a result of their prolonged ordeal and yet remain unable to return to insecure neighborhoods and destroyed or occupied homes. In many cases, their homes have become part of the patronage system of local politicians and sectarian militias, giving them a new economic and political significance to these groups that greatly complicates the prospect for their restitution.

Perhaps most demanding, Iraq now faces a series of fundamental political challenges that are likely to overshadow efforts to address displacement. The Iraqi Parliament is currently considering a law that would pave the way for provincial elections. While these elections themselves are likely to cause considerable tensions in Iraq's highly unresolved political landscape, the resulting provincial councils will have a constitutional mandate to initiate the process of forming powerful regions uniting areas controlled by Iraq's respective ethnic and sectarian groups. The demarcation of such regions would be highly contentious, placing these groups in direct conflict over disputed areas controlling access to large oil reserves. At best, these processes will distract significant political attention and resources from concrete measures to support restitution and return. At worst, they may result in renewed displacement and even consolidation of quasi-permanent ethnic enclaves. Impoverished, aggrieved, and dispossessed of their homes and homelands, these uprooted populations could destabilize the region for decades.

...few have realized that the success of the political agenda in Iraq depends not only on the immediate-term space created by military gains but also on the long-term sustainability created by attention to the humanitarian needs and human rights of victims of the conflict.

The international community has every reason to support Iraq's incipient efforts to bring about restitution and end displacement. Doing so would foster long-term stability in Iraq and underscore the fact that the post-2001 emphasis on fighting terrorism need not imply the complete renunciation of the human rights gains seen in post-displacement settings like Bosnia since the end of the Cold War. However, as a UN human rights official recently put it, few have realized that the success of the political agenda in Iraq depends not only on the immediate-term space created by military gains but also on the long-term sustainability created by attention to the humanitarian needs and human rights of victims of the conflict. The Iraqi authorities have formally renounced sectarian partition as a political option. They not only deserve the support of the international community in transforming these words into deeds, but will need it dearly in the months ahead.

Progress and Shortfalls of the International Response

Kristele Younes

Until late 2006, the US government refused to recognize the dramatic humanitarian consequences of the war in Iraq. The millions of Iraqis displaced within and outside of their country received only basic assistance from a few humanitarian agencies, and were left without any protection. Most of the countries where Iraqi refugees have sought asylum are not signatories to the Refugee Convention and consider these refugees as "guests," creating a constant fear of deportation. Inside Iraq, access to displaced persons is severely limited, and until recently, the focus was only on security and the political situation, not on the massive human tragedy.

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Thankfully, since 2007 the situation has changed. Faced with increased levels of displacement, confronted with the reality of Iraqi asylum seekers in Europe and elsewhere, and urged by the United Nations and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to step up to the plate, international donors have started addressing the crisis. Still, much more needs to be done to ensure that the basic needs of those displaced are met, that they can continue to benefit from safe asylum, and that the displacement crisis does not further destabilize the region.

In the region, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took the lead in addressing the needs of Iraqi refugees and displaced persons. While the agency's budget to address the Iraqi crisis was almost non-existent in 2006, it has increased substantially in the past two years, reaching a level of $261 million for the region in 2008. This allowed UNHCR to start cash assistance programs for the most vulnerable refugees and to help provide healthcare and education. UNHCR was also able to increase its capacity to register refugees and refer the most vulnerable to resettlement countries. Initially slower to react, other UN agencies are now addressing the needs in the region; coordination between actors has also improved.

In an effort to mobilize and engage donors, UNHCR organized an international conference in Geneva in April 2007. As a result, the United States increased its humanitarian budgets both in and outside Iraq. In 2008, for the first time, the United States contributed over 30% to a UN appeal, signaling awareness of its special role in leading other donors in responding appropriately. Resettlement numbers increased as well. In 2006, the United States resettled just 202 Iraqis. In 2008, it has committed to resettle 12,000. Other donors have also increased their contributions to the Iraqi crisis. Initially reluctant to address what many saw as a "US problem," European and others now consider

the Iraqi crisis a priority for them as well.

There have also been positive steps taken inside Iraq. In 2007, the United Nations finally referred to Iraq as a "humanitarian emergency," and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was set up to improve humanitarian activities in the country. Despite the UN's primary political mandate in Iraq, more space was carved to address humanitarian needs both by the Security Council in its resolutions and by agencies on the ground. The appointment of a humanitarian expert as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in Iraq was also a positive sign that the UN was making humanitarian needs a priority. In February 2008, the United Nations issued its first common humanitarian appeal for Iraq, forcing donors and the government of Iraq to acknowledge that Iraq is unable to meet the needs of its people and that the international community needs to step in.

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Despite these positive steps, the situation in and outside the country remains dire. All of Iraq's neighbors have closed their borders to Iraqis, making it virtually impossible for anyone to flee the country. Syria and Jordan, which host the majority of the refugees, are growing increasingly impatient, fearing they might face a protracted crisis, similar to that of the Palestinian refugees. Most refugees live in 'Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo, and these cities' infrastructures are unable to accommodate such large populations. Hospitals and schools are overburdened, and many Iraqis feel the pressure to return to Iraq. Inside Iraq, humanitarian access is extremely limited, and the lack of response by the central government and the international community has reinforced the position of non-state actors, who now use humanitarian assistance as a political tool.

UNHCR has been clear: The conditions in Iraq do not warrant returns. Yet the Iraqi government, instead of spending its billions of dollars in humanitarian assistance, persists in encouraging returns by providing financial and other incentives and without consideration for the need for a larger plan to tackle such issues as restitution or compensation for lost properties. The US government, instead of firmly condemning this behavior, has sent mixed messages — expressing concern for returns one day, encouraging them the next. Instead, it is essential that the United Nations continue to regularly assess the conditions for returns throughout the country and for Iraq and the United States to respect these assessments. Iraq, with the help of the United States and the UN, should also work to address the needs of the displaced now and work towards developing a comprehensive plan for future returns. Only then will returns be voluntary, safe, and sustainable.

Meanwhile, donors, especially the United States and Iraq, must fund all outstanding UN and NGO appeals, which total between $800 and $900 million in 2008. The United States should lead the effort by funding at least 50% of all appeals. Donors must also provide significant bilateral assistance to host countries to help build the governments' capacity to handle the situation, improve the state of the infrastructure, and keep asylum space open. According to US Senior

Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues Ambassador James Foley, the cost of offsetting increased spending on social services for Iraqis in host countries currently comes to $900 million, maybe more.

It is also essential that the United States engage Syria, which hosts the most Iraqi refugees, on this issue. Furthermore, resettlement numbers must increase, with priority given to the most vulnerable as determined by UNHCR. These would include women at risk, victims of torture, and stateless Palestinian refugees from Iraq. The US goal of 12,000 is an improvement over the past, but falls very short of the need.

Addressing the humanitarian needs of displaced Iraqis is not only a moral imperative, but is also essential to the stability of Iraq and the rest of the region. Stability is jeopardized by large refugee flows and increased resentment of the refugees by their host communities. Finally, the rebuilding of Iraq hinges on its educated middle class citizens maintaining their skills and returning when conditions enable them to do so. The international community must mobilize to ensure that Iraqi refugees can remain in their host countries and have access to local markets until such time as the conditions in Iraq are conducive to their safe return.

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V

The Echoes of Experience and History

Arrival

Nomi Stone

Nur, an Iraqi refugee who has been in the States for four days, is dipping parsley in a china cup of salt water in Bethesda, Maryland. The salt water signifies tears shed over slavery and displacement; the parsley stands for spring and hope. Another interpretation likens the act in the Passover Seder to a biblical moment of betrayal: Joseph's brothers sold him into slavery and dipped his striped garment in blood to feign his death.

In the hubbub of a Seder attended by one rabbi, two ministers, one former professional figure skater, two writers, one lawyer, and one lapsed Catholic, I murmur to Nur: It is at once both *damua*ʿ (tears) and *rabea*ʿ (spring).

A week prior, a minister friend of mine, Louise, told me that her church would be helping a newly-resettled Iraqi refugee acclimate to the city. Louise did not know if Nur, the woman in question, would speak much English. Startled that the International Rescue Commission (IRC) had not anticipated this challenge and found a translator, I offered to accompany Louise to the airport and serve that role.

Nur arrived in a leather jacket, carrying a haggard elegance and a jittery self-restraint in her eyes. When I spoke to her in Arabic, relief flashed across her face; she asked please for a cup of Nescafe black — "no milk and no sugar since what had happened to me in Iraq" — and to sit down. In the empty 10 pm terminal, Nur told her story, slowing her Baghdadi Arabic into a fastidious Modern Standard Arabic, with some Egyptian dialect for intimacy.

Nur grew up in a wealthy, Sunni family in a three-story corner house with a garden and a pet parrot in Baghdad. She got a Masters in Interior Design and traveled to Europe. "We were a cultured family. We had friends from the whole city, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish. We felt safe under Saddam." After the US invasion of Iraq, Nur's former life became unrecognizable: "Because it was a strategic location, US troops took over my home. We had to leave our house." Perhaps 2004 was the first year of the war that sectarianism made dark and irreversible fissures in the country; the ʿAshura massacre of March attributed to al-Qaʿida, which killed nearly 200 and injured some 500 Shiʿa Muslims, signaled a turn in the war. In 2004, four men — three Iraqi Shiʿa and one Iranian — kidnapped Nur for eight days. She was repeatedly raped and singed with cigarette

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butts. Nur fled to ʻAmman to live with family friends.

I asked Nur why she had chosen to come to the US. She replied, "I thought Dr. Phil could help me." Nur felt that the TV pop psychologist, who doles out advice on everything from weight loss to teenage rebellion to marital rape, might be able to offer her a strategy on how to move forward. In the past several months, Nur has stumbled forward and backward, hindered by a far from perfect system in a country unaccustomed to integrating Iraqi refugees, as well as by her own unrealistic expectations and demands. The IRC, after some slow bumbling, provided temporary housing, visits to a doctor to help Nur alleviate her back pain, and a therapist affiliated with Torture Abolition and Survivors Support Coalition International (TASSC) who spoke Arabic. Nur was terrified to leave her room, was afraid of police sirens, and did not feel the IRC was helping her with the daily tasks of starting a life anew. Nur decided that she did not want to stay in Washington. She wanted to move to Boston, where another Iraqi refugee she knew in ʻAmman had been resettled in the same period. After some shuffling of paperwork by the IRC and a near purchase of a plane ticket to Boston, Nur decided she would prefer to live in Salt Lake City, to be near another Iraqi she knew. This too fell through and Nur decided that perhaps Delaware was the best solution, as she knew an Iraqi family there as well. At this juncture, with frustration accumulating on both sides, Nur and her case-worker — herself an Iraqi refugee resettled only nine months prior — had a falling out. Nur was increasingly fragile and increasingly demanding; the local IRC staff was a bit exasperated and not fully competent.

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Nur found her own living accommodations through connections of friends in ʻAmman. An educated Shiʻa Iraqi family, a couple with a young daughter, could take Nur in for $500 a month. Last week, I visited Nur in her new accommodations. She is sleeping on a little bed in the master bedroom, along with the couple and their child. The small living room has a velour-draped couch, a little TV, and Nur's English textbook. She brings me a dish of salted nuts and a coffee (with milk and one sugar).

A Note from the Jewish Past — A Comparison between Iraqi Refugees in Arab States Today and Jewish Iraqi Migrants in Israel

Orit Bashkin

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As we look at the horrendous state of Iraqi refugees[1] today, a comparison between them and their Jewish brethren who immigrated to Israel in the early 1950s seems irrelevant, almost insolent. The exodus of over 120,000 Iraqi Jews was marked by its finality. These Iraqi Jews were integrated into Israeli society, and very few attempted to return to Iraq. In contrast, many Iraqi refugees seek to return to their homeland once conditions in Iraq stabilize. Furthermore, the former was a migration of *one*, albeit influential, minority community, whilst in the present destruction of the civil war, members of all religious communities are leaving Iraq.

And yet, there are very good reasons for such a comparison. In both waves of migration, events occurring outside of Iraq changed the power dynamics inside the country, thus generating an intolerable situation that pushed people to migrate. Iraqi Jews left their country because of the conflict in Palestine. The deteriorating relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, the activities of the state of Israel in Iraq, and the inability of Iraqi ultranationalists to distinguish between Judaism and Zionism are often noted as the key reasons for their migration. Even after a wave of urban rioting in 1941, the *Farhud*, in which more than 150 Jews were killed and many more wounded, only a few Jews had left Iraq. Similarly, despite Saddam Husayn's brutality and insufferable violence and the atrocious years of sanctions, Iraqis did not leave their country on the mass scale seen today. Moreover, it was factors from the outside, especially the implausible links made between the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Ba'th regime, that ignited an occupation that resulted in a bloody civil war. Foreign intervention by Iraq's neighbors complicated the civil war even further and forced more Iraqis to migrate. While one cannot ignore the horrors inflicted on Iraqis by their fellow Iraqis, it is impossible to ignore the enormous role that outside factors played in the current refugee crisis.

Once outside of Iraq, the socioeconomic conditions of the refugees affected their integration into their new countries. As Iraqi Jewish elites were mostly Western educated and came from the middle and upper classes, many were able to integrate into Israeli socioeconomic life in spite of many difficulties (unlike Arab-Jews from North Africa, for example). Correspondingly, the education of many of the current refugees enabled

1. The word "refugee" in the context of the Iraqi civil war has many meanings. In this essay, the word signifies an Iraqi individual who was forced to leave Iraq because of the war.

them to find positions as professors, businessmen, and professionals in other Arab countries. Education, religious community, and socioeconomic status determined, to a large degree, the lot of Iraqi refugees in other Arab countries.

Jewish Iraqi immigrants to Israel, who lost practically everything because of legislation that froze their assets in Iraq, had discovered the gap between official national discourses and daily realities. Official Zionist discourse had spoken of the brotherhood of all Jews; all were to be equal citizens in the state of Israel. Yet having arrived from an Arab country, Iraqi Jews sometimes faced discrimination in Israel. Regardless of the fact that members of the bourgeois Iraqi Jewish elites were conversant in at least one European language, if not two, and that their education and leisure habits were rooted in both the European and Arab traditions, they were marked as "Eastern," "Oriental," and "Arab." Similarly, before and during the present war in Iraq, Arab intellectuals and politicians expressed their solidarity with their occupied Arab-Iraqi brethren. Sadly, these public announcements have not always been translated into action. Although many Arab professionals, intellectuals, and human rights activists have courageously and tirelessly assisted Iraqi refugees, the refugees face discrimination and abuse in their new dwelling places. Iraqis, such as Shi'ites in Sunni states, are "other-ed," marked as a danger to states' stability and security, and discriminated against in terms of labor, welfare policies, and migration laws. A host of phenomena, ranging from the somewhat harmless grumbling about rising inflation and real estate values due to the presence of Iraqi refugees to the inhumane trafficking of Iraqi women into various Arab countries, serves to convey the fact that Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic sympathy to *Iraq* is not extended to the *Iraqis* themselves.

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There is, however, something about Iraqi Jews who emigrated to Israel that enables us to think with some hope about the present refugee crisis. Irrespective of their anger towards the elements in Iraqi society that caused their migration, Iraqi Jews in Israel, especially the generation educated in Iraqi high schools, remained loyal to Iraqi culture. Iraqi Jewish life was commemorated in their writings, social activities, and cultural practices. Celebrated novelist Samir Naqash continued writing in Arabic, even while living in Israel. Eminent writers Sami Michael and Shim'on Ballas wrote novels in Hebrew commemorating the lives of Iraqi Jews in their old homeland. Iraqi Jews produced autobiographies, some in Arabic, detailing their lives in Iraq. The Israeli Museum for the History of Babylonian Jewry, notwithstanding its emphasis on the activities of the Zionist movement in Iraq, has done much to document the rich life of the community. Iraqi Jewish professors, like Sasson Somekh, Shmuel Moreh, and David Sameh, played a seminal role in developing the field of modern Arabic literature in Israeli academia and explored the works of Iraqi poets and writers. Iraqi Jewish musicians continued playing familiar Iraqi and Middle Eastern music. The narratives produced by Iraqi Jews combine a variety of contradictory elements: nostalgia, love of Arabic literature, longing for a lost coexistence between Arabs and Jews, and rage towards those who forced them to leave. But, above all, they emphasize the fact that Iraq still plays a crucial role in the lives of those who left it.

While I do not wish to produce an Iraqi national narrative, as most Iraqi Jews no longer identify Iraq as their homeland

and consider themselves Israelis, let us note that their love of the landscape of their childhood, of Iraqi food, music, literature, and folklore, is undeniable. Even when Jewish writers reconstruct painful moments in the history of the community, like the *Farhud*, many mention the Muslim neighbors that assisted them during those dreadful times. Their nostalgia for Iraq derives from the Iraqi education system that cultivated Arab and Iraqi nationalism, from the relationship of neighborhood and commerce between Iraqi Jews and Muslims, and from the ability, even after so many years, to commemorate these elements.

And here lies the hope for the Iraqi refugees at present. The connections celebrated by Iraqi Jews relate to a common *Iraqi* culture: a love for the same landscape, a collective history and memory, and the ability to ignore religious differences for the sake of a shared vision of pluralism and coexistence. These very same bonds were, and are, tragically and violently broken in civil war. Warlords, militiamen, and corrupt politicians have created a reality that did not allow those bonds to survive, favoring ethno-religious cleansing in their stead. Moreover, current Iraqi refugees bitterly remember the sects, militias, politicians, and occupiers whom, they feel, forced them out of Iraq. Naturally, these refugees are more sectarian and less hopeful than the Iraqis of the previous decade. But many still identify themselves as Iraqis (in addition to being Sunnis, Shi'ites, or Christians), and are being identified as Iraqis by others. Many are also resentful towards their host states. Their frightful mistreatment outside of Iraq also encourages them to think of ways to reconstruct what was lost in Iraq. In their writings, blogs, posting on the Internet, and op-ed pieces, many still conceptualize an Iraqi state that should be resurrected anew. The same websites visited by Iraqi Jews, which celebrate Iraqi music, poetry, and literature, are visited by Iraqi refugees, who relate to them as a symbol of a better past, despite their recent memories of aggression and massacres.

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Sasson Somekh ended his recently published memoirs by referencing the words of his friend, Egyptian novelist Nagib Mahfuz. Arabs and Jews, wrote Mahfuz, "knew extraordinary partnership for many years in ancient times, in medieval times, and in the modern age, with times of quarrels and disputes few and far between. Unfortunately, we documented the disputes one hundred times more than the periods of friendship and cooperation." Somekh sided with Mahfuz's dream for a future of collaboration. One hopes that such a dream would be possible also for current Iraqi refugees, of all sects and religions, who now experience the worst aspects of religious fanaticism and exploitation.

Maps

Major Towns and Cities in Iraq

Source: UNHCR

IDP and Returnee Locations (June 2008)



Source: IOM

Displaced Iraqis (in thousands, March 2008)



Source: UNHCR

Number of IDP Families Displaced out and within Baghdad by Governorate (Feb. 2008)



Source: UNHCR

Internally Displaced Religious Minorities (February 2008)



Source: IOM

IDPs by District and Returnee Location (March 2008)



Source: IOM

IDP Locations (March 2008)



Source: IOM

IDPs by District (March 2008)



Source: IOM

Iraqi Population in the Middle East: Demographic Breakdown by Age Group (September 2007)



Source: UNHCR

Statistics

IDPs in Iraq since April 2003

2003	400,000
2004	800,000
2005	1,200,000
2006	2,000,000
2007	2,740,000
2008	2,770,000

Note: Numbers are cumulative, but do not include those displaced prior to March 2003 (approx. 1 million).

Source: Brookings Iraq Index

Total Number of IDPs by Region of Current Residence (April 2007)

Governorate	**IDPs in Residence**
Sulaymaniyya	332,736
Erbil	223,716
Dahuk	184,400
Karbala	164,550
Baghdad	143,202
Missan	142,146
Basra	120,468
Diyala	80,250
Ninewa	76,062
Anbar	71,376
Najaf	66,864
Salah al-Din	65,196
Babylon	62,850
Wasit	61,398
Thi Qar	57,264
Qadisiyya	25,524
Muthanna	15,438
Kirkuk	13,944
Total	**1,907,384**

Source: Brookings Iraq Index

Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Cumulative)

2003-2004	366,000
2005	889,000
2006	1,800,000
2007	2,400,000

Source: Brookings Iraq Index

Number of Iraqi Asylum Applicants by Country, 2006 and January to June 2007

Country	**2006**	**January-June 2007**
Sweden	8,950	9,329
Netherlands	2,765	562
Germany	2,065	817
Greece	1,415	3,485
United Kingdom	1,305	665
Norway	1,000	485
Switzerland	815	513
Belgium	695	372
Denmark	505	459
Austria	380	188
Finland	225	106
Ireland	215	141
Slovakia	205	76
Canada	190	129
Australia	185	86
Cyprus	130	90
United States	535	385
France	115	69
Total	**21,695**	**17,957**

Source: Brookings Iraq Index

Iraqi Refugees in Europe, 1970-2006

Countries with 100,000+ Refugees

	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
Sweden		177,798	77,157	90,844	345,799
Germany			72,697	231,047	303,744
Netherlands		75,565	77,477	104,662	235,922
United Kingdom	2,121	32,310	42,045	90,531	167,007
Denmark	1,079	51,093	36,905	43,900	132,977
Total	3,200	336,766	240,851	560,984	1,185,449

Countries with 10,000+ Refugees

	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
Norway			8,599	24,141	33,212	65,952
Greece	13,550	7,830	12,146	2,082	3,641	39,249
Switzerland			5,278	7,857	15,430	28,565
France			6,842	4,804	5,454	17,100
Italy		3,366	4,755	3,342	5,341	16,804
Finland			4,672	5,242	6,273	16,187
Austria			3,671	4,822	4,973	13,466
Total	13,550	11,196	45,963	52,290	74,324	197,323

Countries with 1,000-9,999 Refugees

	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
Bulgaria	320	1,447	4,588	6,355
Hungary	28	1,159	4,719	5,906
Romania	1,499	1,139	1,806	4,444
Spain	1,989	995	1,009	3,993
Belgium	933	771	860	2,564
Ukraine	1,551	167	181	1,899
Malta	1,003	107	410	1,520
Ireland		393	1,005	1,398
Total	7,323	6,178	14,578	28,079

Iraqi Refugees in the Middle East, 1970-2006

Countries with 1,000,000+ Refugees

	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
Iran	30,000	2,605,000	7,625,795	973,671	351,393	11,585,859
Total	30,000	2,605,000	7,625,795	973,671	351,393	11,585,859

Countries with 100,000-999,999 Refugees

	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
Syria	1,610	189,619	5,222	741,700	938,151
Jordan		3,981	2,930	502,608	509,519
Saudi Arabia		141,707	15,377	1,759	158,843
Total	1,610	335,307	23,529	1,246,067	1,606,513

Countries with less than 100,000 Refugees

	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
Kuwait		200	88,740	1,923	1,306	92,169
Turkey		3,430	57,094	1,603	659	62,976
Lebanon	1,560	3,500	11,737	5,401	23,421	49,719
Pakistan		1,940	11,457	765	400	14,562
Yemen			358	514	3,007	3,879
Libya			328	127	163	618
UAE			195	73	35	303
Total	1,560	9,070	159,909	10,406	28,991	224,226

Iraqi Refugees in the Americas, 1980-2006

	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
United States	2,052	136,250	50,384	44,854	233,540
Canada		36,725	17,536	19,622	59,885
Brazil		309	220	343	824
Total	2,052	173,284	68,140	64,819	294,249

Iraqi Refugees in Oceania, 1990-2006

	1990-1999	2000-2002	2003-2006	Total
Australia	38,918	32,924	45,634	98,743
New Zealand	3,731	2,545	3,359	9,635
Indonesia	8	1,083	382	1,473
Total	42,657	36,552	49.375	109,851

Source: UNHCR

Iraqi Refugee Flows in the Middle East, 1988-2006

Iran

	1988-1989	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Repatriated to Iraq	44,000	1,336,150	141,743	6,506	50,524	191,648	55,267		18,258,838
Originating from Iraq	1,000,000	4,839,727	2,786,068	973,671	150,196	93,173	54,000	54,024	9,950,859

Jordan

	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Repatriated to Iraq		41		14	249	319	173	796
Originating from Iraq	816	3,165	2,930	965	889	754	500,000	509,519

Kuwait

	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Repatriated to Iraq	60	138						198
Originating from Iraq	79,869	8,871	1,923	417	418	422	49	91,969

Lebanon

	1988-1989	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Repatriated to Iraq		2	47		29	1,531	431	1	2,041
Originating from Iraq	3,500	2,678	9,059	5,401	1,476	1,148	797	20,000	44,059

Saudi Arabia

	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Repatriated to Iraq	3,220	671	416	4,524	386	84	119	9,420
Originating from Iraq	102,531	39,176	15,377	706	440	363	250	158,843

Syria

	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Repatriated to Iraq		63	2		33			98
Originating from Iraq	85,000	104,619	5,222	2,435	14,391	24,874	700,000	936,541

Turkey

	1988-1989	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Repatriated to Iraq	280	18,655	37	8	103	69	32	11	19,195
Originating from Iraq	3,240	48,502	8,592	1,603	267	125	126	141	62,596

Source: UNHCR

Governorate IDP Profiles

Anbar

Capital: Ramadi

Population: 1,485,985

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 1,025 families (est. 29,418 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 8,876 families (est. 51,487 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	77.27%
Anbar	16.41%
Basra	6.19%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	0.5%
Sunni Arab	99.3%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	19.1%
Direct Threats to Life	30.1%
Forced Displacement from Property	28.5%
Generalized Violence	43.7%
Left out of Fear	8.9%
Other	0.2%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	0.7%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	57.8%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	6.5%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	23.1%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	22.1%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	57.8%
Iraqi Red Crescent	19.5%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	2.2%
Humanitarian Organization	66.8%
Other	0.7%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.0%
Relatives	22.3%
Religious Group	57.4%
Has Not Received Assistance	6.6%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


ANBAR – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by
number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Syria
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Anbar
Al-Rutba
Al-Ka'im
Ana
Haditha
Heet
Hit
Ramadi
Al Fallujah
Falluja
Ar Rutbah
0 35 70 140 210 280
Kilometers

Babylon

Capital: Hilla

Population: 1,651,565

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 1,475 families (est. 8,850 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 12,799 families (est. 77,914 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	82.60%	Anbar	1.93%
Diyala	5.84%	Wassit	1.06%
Babylon	5.65%	Kirkuk	0.66%
Salah al-Din	2.06%	Other	0.20%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	94.4%
Sunni Arab	5.3%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	1.7%
Direct Threats to Life	59.5%
Forced Displacement from Property	54.7%
Generalized Violence	50.5%
Left out of Fear	57.2%
Other	0.9%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	3.4%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	16.7%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	8.1%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	10.4%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	6.0%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	62.0%
Iraqi Red Crescent	56.9%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	30.2%
NGO or UN Agency	1.4%
Other Iraqi Government Body	13.2%
Relatives	27.4%
Has Not Received Assistance	26.1%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


BABYLON – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Diyala
Diyala
Wassit
Baghdad
Anbar
Babylon
Kerbala
Najaf
Qadissiya
Al-Mahawil
Hashimiya
Hilla
Al Aziziya
As Suwayrah
Mahmudiya
Al Misiab
Al-Musayab
Al Mahawil
Al Hashimiyah
Abu Gharaq
Al Qasim
Shomeli
Jurfas Sakhr
Al Mashru'
Hilla
Al Imam
Jamjamah
Al Hashimiyah
Kilometers
0
12.5
25
50
75
100

Baghdad

Capital: Baghdad

Population: 7,145,470

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 3,867 families (est. 23,202 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 92,936 families (est. 563,771 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	80.29%	Kirkuk	0.35%
Diyala	16.40%	Ninewa	0.32%
Anbar	1.71%	Babylon	0.16%
Salah al-Din	0.90%	Other	0.22%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	80.0%	Shi'a Kurd	0.1%
Sunni Arab	19.8%	Yazidi Arab	0.02%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	24.8%
Direct Threats to Life	56.5%
Forced Displacement from Property	39.4%
Generalized Violence	36.4%
Left out of Fear	39.5%
Other	0.8%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	3.0%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.2%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	4.5%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	1.4%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	25.6%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	20.9%
Iraqi Red Crescent	16.0%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	10.7%
Humanitarian Organization	14.0%
Other	0.1%
Other Iraqi Government Body	2.6%
Relatives	30.0%
Religious Group	27.2%
Has Not Received Assistance	54.8%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


BAGHDAD – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Salah al-Din
Tarmia
Diyala
Istiqlal
Taji
Al Resafa
Abu Ghraib
Karkh
Baghdad
Mada'in
Anbar
Mahmoudiya
Wassit
Babylon
Kerbala
Legend
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
0 5 10 20 30 40
Kilometers

Basra

Capital: Basra

Population: 1,912,533

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 15,778 families (est. 94,668 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 6,031 families (est. 35,718 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	51.64%	Kirkuk	4.15%
Salah al-Din	26.54%	Babylon	2.01%
Anbar	8.13%	Basra	0.66%
Diyala	6.40%	Other	0.22%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	99.99%
Sunni Arab	0.01%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	0.5%
Direct Threats to Life	95.5%
Forced Displacement from Property	2.1%
Generalized Violence	0.6%
Left out of Fear	5.2%
Other	0.0%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	1.4%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.1%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	2.4%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.6%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	13.5%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	14.1%
Iraqi Red Crescent	33.1%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	20.8%
Humanitarian Organization	4.4%
Other	0.5%
Other Iraqi Government Body	1.6%
Relatives	23.4%
Religious Group	12.5%
Has Not Received Assistance	46.4%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


BASRAH – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006 IDP MONITORING AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Missan
Thi-Qar
Muthanna
Basrah
Al-Zubair
Kuwait
Iran
Shatt Al-Arab
Fao
Abu Al-Khaseeb
Al-Midaina
Al-Qurna
Chibayish
Suq ash Shuyukh
Az Zubayr
Abu al Khasib
Al Faw
0 15 30 60 90 120
Kilometers

Dahuk

Capital: Dahuk

Population: 954,087

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 22,474 families (est. 134,844 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 18,733 families (est. 104,948 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	56.51%	Anbar	0.38%
Ninewa	41.69%	Salah al-Din	0.06%
Kirkuk	0.69%	Muthanna	0.03%
Basra	0.50%	Other	0.06%

Ethnicity/Religion

Sunni Kurd	35.6%	Christian Assyrian	20.8%	Sunni Arab	2.4%
Christian Chaldean	31.5%	Christian Armenian	4.0%	Shi'a Arab	2.1%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	37.0%
Direct Threats to Life	71.6%
Forced Displacement from Property	8.0%
Generalized Violence	88.1%
Left out of Fear	91.3%
Other	0.5%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	2.5%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.9%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	0.6%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.2%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	13.3%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	4.0%
Iraqi Red Crescent	19.1%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	0.1%
Humanitarian Organization	4.2%
Other	0.3%
Other Iraqi Government Body	17.1%
Relatives	12.8%
Religious Group	19.8%
Has Not Received Assistance	45.0%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


DAHUK– IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
43°0'0"E
44°0'0"E
37°0'0"N
Turkey
Syria
Zakho
Zakho
Amedi
Amedi
Dahuk
Dahuk
Dahuk
Sumel
Erbil
Erbil
Akre
Ain Sifne
Ninewa
Tilkef
Talafar
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
0 10 20 40 60 80
Kilometers

Diyala

Capital: Baquba

Population: 1,560,621

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 9,100 families (est. 54,600 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 17,198 families (est. 103,426 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Diyala	83.47%	Kirkuk	0.15%
Baghdad	15.84%	Salah al-Din	0.12%
Anbar	0.19%	Basra	0.04%
Babylon	0.16%	Qadissiya	0.02%

Ethnicity/Religion

Sunni Arab	50.7%	Shi'a Kurd	7.8%	Shi'a Turkmen	0.5%
Shi'a Arab	39.5%	Sunni Kurd	1.37%	Sunni Turkmen	0.13%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	27.2%
Direct Threats to Life	53.2%
Forced Displacement from Property	55.1%
Generalized Violence	57.4%
Left out of Fear	36.8%
Other	1.6%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	16.1%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	50.7%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	8.8%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	11.5%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	39.4%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	59.3%
Iraqi Red Crescent	34.0%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	19.9%
Humanitarian Organization	16.9%
Other	3.0%
Other Iraqi Government Body	2.2%
Relatives	44.2%
Religious Group	16.6%
Has Not Received Assistance	20.3%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


DIYALA – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by
number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Kirkuk
Sulaymaniyah
Salah al-Din
Anbar
Baghdad
Wassit
Iran
Diyala
Kifri
Kalar
Khanaqin
Touz Hourmato
Al-Khalis
Al-Muqdadiya
Balad Ruz
Ba'quba
Baladrooz
Adhamiyah
Rusafa
Karkh
Rashead
Abu Gharaib
Mansour
Balad
Badrah
0 15 30 60 90 120
Kilometers

Erbil

Capital: Erbil

Population: 1,392,093

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 32,813 families (est. 196,878 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 10,339 families (est. 62,034 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Ninewa	46.76%	Salah al-Din	0.76%
Baghdad	45.78%	Anbar	0.74%
Kirkuk	2.52%	Basra	0.71%
Diyala	1.94%	Other	0.53%

Ethnicity/Religion

Sunni Kurd	39.7%	Sunni Arab	21.8%	Christian Kurd/Other/Arab	2.9%
Christian Chaldean	23.5%	Christian Assyrian	5.9%	Shi'a Arab	1.6%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	0.3%
Direct Threats to Life	11.1%
Forced Displacement from Property	0.0%
Generalized Violence	48.4%
Left out of Fear	97.2%
Other	0.1%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	0.5%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	89.9%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	95.8%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.1%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	0.5%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	0.0%
Iraqi Red Crescent	0.1%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	0.0%
Humanitarian Organization	0.8%
Other	0.0%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.0%
Relatives	0.1%
Religious Group	4.9%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


ERBIL– IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2007
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by
number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Turkey
Iran
Dahuk
Amedi
Mergasur
Mergasur Lower
Azadi
Soran
Akre
Ain Sifne
Choman
Choman [1]
Tilkef
Ninewa
Shaqlawa
Al Hamdaniyah
Erbil
Ranya
Koysinjaq
Koisnjaq
Sulaymaniyah
Makhmur
Dibs
Kirkuk
Chamchamal
Salah al-Din
0 12.5 25 50 75 100
Kilometers

Karbala

Capital: Karbala

Population: 887,858

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 18,818 families (est. 112,908 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 8,617 families (est. 55,962 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	53.78%	Kirkuk	2.82%
Diyala	23.38%	Salah al-Din	1.67%
Anbar	8.50%	Karbala	1.65%
Babylon	3.05%	Wassit	0.16%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	98.2%
Shi'a Turkmen	1.4%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	32.0%
Direct Threats to Life	78.6%
Forced Displacement from Property	32.5%
Generalized Violence	41.0%
Left out of Fear	48.2%
Other	0.9%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	24.3%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	28.3%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	14.3%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.1%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	17.1%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	28.3%
Iraqi Red Crescent	53.7%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	41.9%
NGO or UN Agency	1.5%
Other Iraqi Government Body	11.0%
Relatives	48.5%
Has Not Received Assistance	47.7%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


KERBALA – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Baghdad
Babylon
Al Misiab
Al-Hindiya
Kerbala
Najaf
Ain Al-Tamur
Anbar
Kilometers
0
10
20
40
60
80

Kirkuk

Capital: Kirkuk

Population: 902,019

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 1,252 families (est. 7,512 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 7,958 families (est. 47,748 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Diyala	28.96%	Kirkuk	15.17%
Baghdad	18.92%	Anbar	2.17%
Salah al-Din	17.14%	Erbil	0.32%
Ninewa	16.30%	Other	0.49%

Ethnicity/Religion

Sunni Arab	51.8%	Sunni Kurd	18.2%	Shi'a Arab	2.8%
Shi'a Turkmen	18.8%	Sunni Turkmen	3.2%	Other	4.2%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	4.2%
Direct Threats to Life	45.3%
Forced Displacement from Property	1.6%
Generalized Violence	84.6%
Left out of Fear	68.4%
Other	2.6%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	48.4%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	17.2%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	27.0%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	27.1%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	23.1%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	5.9%
Iraqi Red Crescent	3.9%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	14.4%
Humanitarian Organization	5.2%
Other	16.3%
Other Iraqi Government Body	1.0%
Relatives	15.5%
Religious Group	5.7%
Has Not Received Assistance	58.6%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


KIRKUK – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Ninewa
Erbil
Sulaymaniyah
Kirkuk
Diyala
Salah al-Din
Al-Hawiga
Makhmur
Chamchamal
Touz Hourmato
Kfri
Daquq
Dibs
Haweeja
Bayji
Kilometers
0 5 10 20 30 40

Missan

Capital: Amara

Population: 824,147

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 18,871 families (est. 113,226 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 6,858 families (est. 46,948 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	83.84%	Anbar	1.02%
Diyala	7.67%	Wassit	0.47%
Salah al-Din	4.65%	Babylon	0.34%
Kirkuk	1.55%	Other	0.43%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	99.9%
Sabean Mandean	0.1%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	10.7%
Direct Threats to Life	43.4%
Forced Displacement from Property	30.7%
Generalized Violence	18.4%
Left out of Fear	63.4%
Other	0.6%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	2.5%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	3.3%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	1.0%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	1.9%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	0.0%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	28.4%
Iraqi Red Crescent	23.1%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	52.0%
NGO or UN Agency	2.6%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.0%
Relatives	3.0%
Religious Group	37.9%
Has Not Received Assistance	27.7%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


MISSAN – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by
number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Iran
Wassit
Missan
Thi-Qar
Basrah
Amara
Al-Kahla
Qal'at Saleh
Al-Mejar Al-Kabi
Al-Maimouna
Al-Gharbi
Al Hayy
Refai
Shatrah
0 12.5 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

Muthanna

Capital: Al-Samawa

Population: 614,997

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 861 families (est. 5,166 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 2,641 families (est. 18,351 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	72.44%	Salah al-Din	1.31%
Diyala	14.10%	Ninewa	1.11%
Anbar	7.64%	Wassit	0.71%
Babylon	1.82%	Other	0.87%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	99.99%
Sunni Arab	0.01%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	41.1%
Direct Threats to Life	74.8%
Forced Displacement from Property	34.7%
Generalized Violence	20.4%
Left out of Fear	48.3%
Other	1.9%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	6.0%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.6%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	9.8%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.0%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	0.8%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	5.9%
Iraqi Red Crescent	41.5%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	29.5%
Humanitarian Organization	2.3%
Other	0.0%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.3%
Relatives	18.7%
Religious Group	5.3%
Has Not Received Assistance	27.9%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


MUTHANNA – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by
number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Qadissiya
Najaf
Muthanna
Al-Salman
Thi-Qar
Missan
Basrah
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Al-Rumaitha
Rumaitha
Al-Samawa
Al-Khidhir
As Salman
Refai
Shatrah
Al Mamona
Al Mijar al Kabir
Chibayish
Suq ash Shuyukh
0 15 30 60 90 120
Kilometers

Najaf

Capital: Najaf

Population: 1,081,203

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 3,993 families (est. 23,958 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 10,140 families (est. 58,032 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	87.90%	Babylon	0.96%
Diyala	5.76%	Salah al-Din	0.94%
Anbar	2.01%	Kirkuk	0.80%
Ninewa	1.62%	Wassit	0.02%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	98.2%
Shia Turkmen	1.4%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	1.0%
Direct Threats to Life	98.0%
Forced Displacement from Property	12.3%
Generalized Violence	12.7%
Left out of Fear	3.2%
Other	0.0%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	2.5%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.0%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	15.9%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.0%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	28.2%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	28.3%
Iraqi Red Crescent	69.7%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	21.6%
NGO or UN Agency	0.2%
Other Iraqi Government Body	1.7%
Relatives	13.4%
Has Not Received Assistance	1.6%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


NAJAF – IDP LOCATIONS, DECEMBER 2007
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Kerbala
Babylon
Anbar
Najaf
Qadissiya
Muthanna
Saudi Arabia
Kufa
Al Kufa
Najaf
Ar Ruhaymah
Shamiya
Afak
Al Hamza
Al-Manathera
Rumaitha
As Salman
43°0'0"E
44°0'0"E
45°0'0"E
32°0'0"N
31°0'0"N
30°0'0"N
0 15 30 60 90 120
Kilometers
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more

Ninewa

Capital: Mosul

Population: 2,811,091

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 6,572 families (est. 39,432 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 19,126 families (est. 106,750 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	52.68%	Kirkuk	0.87%
Ninewa	36.57%	Salah al-Din	0.64%
Basra	6.56%	Anbar	0.58%
Diyala	1.21%	Other	0.89%

Ethnicity/Religion

Christian Assyrian	40.1%	Christian Chaldean	12.2%	Sunni Kurd	2.7%
Sunni Arab	27.6%	Sunni Turkmen	12.0%	Other	3.0%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	1.7%
Direct Threats to Life	62.9%
Forced Displacement from Property	17.8%
Generalized Violence	42.5%
Left out of Fear	28.8%
Other	1.0%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	20.2%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	7.5%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	19.1%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	5.5%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	0.0%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	32.6%
Iraqi Red Crescent	32.2%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	42.1%
Humanitarian Organization	14.9%
Other	7.8%
Other Iraqi Government Body	2.1%
Relatives	28.6%
Religious Group	30.2%
Has Not Received Assistance	23.5%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


NINEWA – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1 - 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Turkey
Syria
Dahuk
Erbil
Tameem
Salah al-Din
Ninewa
Anbar
Al-Ba'aj
Hatra
Mosul
Tilkaif
Al-Shikhan
Shekhan
Akre
Al-Hamdaniyah
Telafar
Sinjar
Zakho
Amedi
Mergasur Lower
Shaqlawa
Dibs
Makhmur
Haweeja
Bayji
Hatra
Talafar
Sinjar
0 15 30 60 90 120
Kilometers

Qadissiya

Capital: Diwaniya

Population: 990,483

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 1,154 families (est. 6,924 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 4,111 families (est. 26,320 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	81.44%	Kirkuk	2.38%
Diyala	6.54%	Babylon	1.66%
Anbar	4.62%	Wassit	0.26%
Salah al-Din	2.99%	Other	0.12%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	99.99%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	0.5%
Direct Threats to Life	93.3%
Forced Displacement from Property	0.9%
Generalized Violence	21.2%
Left out of Fear	25.8%
Other	3.4%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	0.6%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.0%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	0.0%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	7.9%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	0.0%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	30.7%
Iraqi Red Crescent	40.7%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	36.3%
NGO or UN Agency	17.6%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.0%
Relatives	2.3%
Religious Group	46.3%
Has Not Received Assistance	15.2%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


QADISSIYA/DIWANIYA – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Kerbala
Babylon
Wassit
Najaf
Qadissiya
Thi-Qar
Muthanna
Hamza
Diwaniya
Al-Shamiya
Shamiya
Afak
Afaq
Al Kufa
Al Hashimiyah
Rumaitha
0 10 20 40 60 80
Kilometers

Salah al-Din

Capital: Tikrit

Population: 1,191,403

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 3,366 families (est. 20,196 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 7,817 families (est. 45,762 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	62.30%	Kirkuk	2.60%
Basra	14.35%	Anbar	2.45%
Diyala	9.34%	Wassit	0.99%
Salah al-Din	5.37%	Other	2.31%

Ethnicity/Religion

Sunni Arab	95.0%	Shi'a Turkmen	1.2%	Sunni Turkmen	0.1%
Shi'a Arab	3.1%	Sunni Kurd	0.6%		

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	14.6%
Direct Threats to Life	75.9%
Forced Displacement from Property	19.2%
Generalized Violence	21.5%
Left out of Fear	10.7%
Other	2.0%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	7.2%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	4.0%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	9.9%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	7.4%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	0.2%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	25.7%
Iraqi Red Crescent	17.0%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	4.3%
Humanitarian Organization	0.4%
Other	0.9%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.7%
Relatives	12.2%
Religious Group	10.5%
Has Not Received Assistance	55.0%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


SALAH AL-DIN – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Ninewa
Erbil
Kirkuk
Sulaymaniyah
Diyala
Baghdad
Salah al-Din
Anbar
Baiji
Samarra
Balad
Al-Shirqat
Tikrit
Al-Daur
Tooz
Touz Hourmato
Chamchamal
Dibs
Makhmur
Haweeja
Bayji
Al Door
Al Khalis
Balad Ruz
Khanaqin
Kalar
Kifri
Adhamiyah
Abu Gharaib
Al Fallujah
Hit
Al Haditha
Hatra
Kilometers
0 15 30 60 90 120

Sulaymaniyah

Capital: Sulaymaniyah

Population: 1,715,585

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 50,465 families (est. 302,790 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 14,254 families (est. 79,672 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Diyala	48.95%	Salah al-Din	0.90%
Baghdad	43.28%	Kirkuk	0.61%
Anbar	2.92%	Basra	0.47%
Ninewa	1.78%	Other	0.99%

Ethnicity/Religion

Sunni Arab	64.1%	Shi'a Arab	9.8%	Yazidi Kurd	0.4%
Sunni Kurd	22.2%	Shi'a Kurd	2.5%	Other	1.04%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	53.8%
Direct Threats to Life	46.6%
Forced Displacement from Property	3.8%
Generalized Violence	88.4%
Left out of Fear	90.4%
Other	6.4%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	1.2%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.0%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	0.5%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.9%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	2.2%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	4.8%
Iraqi Red Crescent	6.8%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	0.0%
Humanitarian Organization	6.1%
Other	0.2%
Other Iraqi Government Body	1.9%
Relatives	0.1%
Religious Group	1.2%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


SULAYMANIAH– IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2008
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Shaqlawa
Rania
Ranya
Pshdar
Erbil
Koysinjaq
Dokan
Dibs
Sharbazher
Penjwin
Iran
Chamchamal
Sulaymaniyah
Sulaymaniya
Kirkuk
Dukaro
Darbandikhan
Halabja
Touz Hourmato
Kalar
Kifri
Diyala
Salah al-Din
0 12.5 25 50 75 100
Kilometers

Thi Qar

Capital: Nassiriya

Population: 1,616,226

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 4,226 families (est. 25,356 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 7,138 families (est. 47,825 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	68.42%	Kirkuk	2.82%
Salah al-Din	13.21%	Babylon	2.43%
Diyala	8.57%	Wassit	1.10%
Anbar	3.06%	Other	0.30%

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	99.99%
Sunni Arab	0.01%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	7.1%
Direct Threats to Life	75.1%
Forced Displacement from Property	34.0%
Generalized Violence	58.6%
Left out of Fear	33.7%
Other	0.5%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	15.2%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.1%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	12.4%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.0%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	7.8%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	35.7%
Iraqi Red Crescent	40.7%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	33.1%
Humanitarian Organization	18.0%
Other	1.9%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.6%
Relatives	45.1%
Religious Group	41.6%
Has Not Received Assistance	27.6%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


THI-QAR – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by
number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Wassit
Qadissiya
Missan
Basrah
Muthanna
Al-Chibayish
Al-Shatra
Thi-Qar
Suq Al-Shoyokh
Nassriya
Al Hayy
Al-Rifa'i
Refai
Shatrah
Al Kahla
Al Majar al Kabir
Qal'at Salih
Al Madiana
Chibayish
Suq ash Shuyukh
Al Khidhir
Alak
Al Hamza
Kilometers
0 10 20 40 60 80

Wassit

Capital: Kut

Population: 1,064,950

Total pre-February 2006 IDPs: 2,030 families (est. 12,180 individuals)

Total post-February 2006 IDPs: 12,259 families (est. 75,326 individuals)

Place of Origin (as of July 1, 2008)

Baghdad	65.17%	Anbar	0.30%
Diyala	32.88%	Salah al-Din	0.14%
Babylon	1.04%		
Kirkuk	0.48%		

Ethnicity/Religion

Shi'a Arab	99.99%
Sunni Arab	0.01%

Reasons for Displacement

Armed Conflict	0.1%
Direct Threats to Life	1.3%
Forced Displacement from Property	1.9%
Generalized Violence	97.9%
Left out of Fear	1.7%
Other	0.0%

Security Statistics

Had Group Members Unaccounted for	0.7%
Must Pass through a Checkpoint to Move near Home	0.3%
Need Authorization to Move from Current Location	1.0%
Reported Other Restrictions on Freedom of Movement	0.0%
Reported Serious Injury or Death	1.0%

Source of Humanitarian Assistance Received

Host Community	53.6%
Iraqi Red Crescent	43.8%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration	84.5%
NGO or UN Agency	28.5%
Other Iraqi Government Body	0.0%
Relatives	2.3%
Religious Group	47.2%
Has Not Received Assistance	11.0%

Source: IOM June 2008 Governorate Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments


WASSIT – IDP LOCATIONS, JUNE 2008
POST-FEBRUARY 2006
IDP MONITORING AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS
Legend
Settlements
Town\ Village
Main Cities
District Center
Governorate Center
Primary Routes
Governorate Boundary
IDP locations by number of families
1- 99
100 - 499
500 - 999
1000 - 1999
2000 and more
Diyala
Iran
Baghdad
Badrah
Badra
Jassan
As Suwayrah
Al Aziziya
Al-Suwaira
Wassit
Al Numaniah
Kut
Babylon
Al Hashimiyah
Al-Na'maniya
Missan
Al Hayy
Najaf
Qadissiya
Shamiya
Al-Hai
Thi-Qar
Thawra City
7 Nissen
Karadah
0 12.5 25 50 75 100
Kilometers

Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: An In-Depth Look

The Norwegian research institute Fafo has released an in-depth study of the Iraqi population in Jordan, entitled "Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics." Fafo has graciously permitted MEI to include data concerning the refugees' characteristics in this publication, which can be found in the following pages. To read the rest of the report, please visit http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/jordan/Iraqis_in_Jordan.htm.

The Fafo researchers encountered and outlined the numerous difficulties present in estimating the current number of Iraqis in Jordan:

> In attempting to determine the estimate that reflects the number of Iraqis in Jordan, the need to balance between the major discrepancies in the figures from the sources mentioned above as well as overcome the shortcomings that all estimates have, required extensive desk research, in addition to the field surveys, to allow the study to fulfill its objectives.
>
> The sample survey conducted by the Norwegian research Institute Fafo in cooperation with the Department of Statistics (DoS) estimated Iraqis at 161,000. The survey was based on interviews in nearly 1000 sample clusters and depended on Iraqis identifying themselves as Iraqi nationals. The comparatively low number may be a result of the fact that Iraqis may have been reluctant to reveal themselves to the Jordanian authorities. They may have feared deportation or other sanctions and therefore preferred not to identify themselves as Iraqis to the survey teams, but rather as Jordanians or other Arab nationalities.
>
> Accordingly the technical team concluded that while the survey has managed to capture the main characteristics of the Iraqi community in Jordan, yet it may not have been able to provide an estimate for the number of Iraqis currently in Jordan on its own.
>
> The Jordanian immigration authority has provided the numbers of Iraqi nationals entering and leaving Jordan since 1990 up to March 2007 estimating them at 547,000. An important weakness in the registration of immigrants and emigrants at the Jordanian borders are known to be that the registration is better for immigrants than for the emigrants. Thus, people may be correctly registered when they are entering into Jordan, but not appropriately accounted for when they leave the country (for example, only the household head might be registered). The problem is especially large for some nationalities (for example Syrians), but due to the particular situation after the Iraq war the shortcomings of registration are believed to be less for Iraqis, especially after 2004.
>
> Jordanian phone companies register the nationality of their phone subscribers. Data has been collected from all the companies operating in Jordan. This gives an estimate of the number of lines ascribed to

Iraqis. All but three thousand are mobile numbers. Based on the information from the phone companies and the characteristics from the survey, an estimate of the number of Iraqis in Jordan can be deduced at 481,000.

The main problem with estimating Iraqis based on the number of active mobile numbers rests in the difficulty in differentiating between Iraqis on short visits on the one hand, and those who have been, or intend to stay, for longer periods of time in Jordan, on the other. Since the vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan view their stay in Jordan as temporary, and await immigration to a third country, or their return to Iraq, once circumstances allow, as will be demonstrated later in the report, it is difficult to determine the duration of a "short stay", which may reflect intention rather than the reality that has significantly prolonged the stay of Iraqis in Jordan.

A second problem is that Iraqis who left during the three month period of registration of active numbers will be counted as resident, even though they were not at the reference date for the estimate of the number. For these reasons the estimate derived from the number of phone subscribers is likely to be somewhat unreliable.

Given the major discrepancies in figures the Jordanian government's technical team was tasked with reconciling the various and contradictory estimates of the size of the Iraqi community and has concluded that the number of Iraqis in Jordan is estimated at 450,000-500,000.[1]

1. Fafo, "Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics." pp. 7-8.

Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: An In-Depth Look

Area of Residence

Area of Residence		Not in ʻAmman	In ʻAmman	Total	Sample Size
Total		20.7%	79.3%	100%	1,691
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	40.8%	59.2%	100%	306
	Low Wealth	41.7%	58.3%	100%	287
	Middle Wealth	17.9%	82.1%	100%	243
	High Wealth	5.9%	94.1%	100%	231
	Highest Wealth	2%	98%	100%	624
Arrival of Head of Household in Jordan	Before 2003	40.1%	59.9%	100%	425
	2003	11.6%	88.4%	100%	131
	2004	21.6%	78.4%	100%	193
	2005	8.9%	91.1%	100%	296
	2006	6.2%	93.8%	100%	465
	2007	8.2%	91.8%	100%	64
Religious Affiliation of Head of Household	Sunni	18.6%	81.4%	100%	949
	Shiʻa	30.4%	69.6%	100%	273
	Catholic	13.6%	86.4%	100%	180
	Orthodox	31.7%	68.3%	100%	73
	Protestant	44.8%	55.2%	100%	3
	Nasatra	-	100%	100%	6
	Sabean	-	100%	100%	60
	Yazidi	-	100%	100%	1
	Others or not stated	10.4%	89.6%	100%	29
Gender of Head of Household	Female	25.8%	74.2%	100%	289
	Male	19.5%	80.5%	100%	1,401
Children in the Household	No Children	23.1%	76.9%	100%	619
	Children	19.1%	80.9%	100%	1,071
Education of Household Head	Still in School	-	100%	100%	59
	Not Completed	44%	56%	100%	52
	Elementary	55.2%	44.8%	100%	121
	Prepatory	31%	69%	100%	158
	Basic	38.1%	61.9%	100%	19
	Vocational Training	62.1%	37.9%	100%	10
	Secondary	12.5%	87.5%	100%	192
	Intermediate Diploma	21.1%	78.9%	100%	215
	Bachelor +	8.2%	91.8%	100%	824
Employment Status of Household Head	Employed	27.4%	72.6%	100%	808
	Unemployed	21.9%	78.1%	100%	126
	Out of Workforce	12.4%	87.6%	100%	756
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	26.3%	73.7%	100%	691
	Not Registered	14.8%	85.2%	100%	873
Status of Household Head's Permit	Valid	16.7%	83.3%	100%	832
	Not Valid	26.3%	73.7%	100%	562

The overwhelming majority of wealthy refugees reside in ʻAmman.

Shiʻa refugees are over 10% more likely to reside outside of ʻAmman than Sunni refugees.

The vast majority of holders of bachelor's degrees reside in ʻAmman.

Religious Affiliation of Household Head

Religious Affiliation of Household Head		Sunni	Shi'a	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant	Nasatra	Sabean	Yazidi	Others or not stated	Total	Sample Size
Total		62.8%	18.1%	9.8%	4.5%	0.1%	0.4%	2.7%	0%	1.6%	100%	1,574
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	54.7%	23.9%	6.9%	5.6%	0%	0.1%	7.4%	0.1%	1.3%	100%	276
	Low Wealth	52.9%	18.7%	15.8%	5.5%	0.2%	1.6%	3%	0%	2.3%	100%	260
	Middle Wealth	64.8%	7.9%	13.7%	9%	0%	0.4%	2.9%	0%	1.3%	100%	226
	High Wealth	69.7%	15.2%	11.7%	1.4%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	100%	221
	Highest Wealth	70%	19.3%	6.2%	2.5%	0.2%	0%	0.1%	0%	1.7%	100%	591
Arrival of Head of Household in Jordan	Before 2003	66%	18.4%	8.2%	4.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.5%	0%	2%	100%	425
	2003	56.7%	27.1%	9.5%	2.9%	0%	0.4%	1.3%	0%	2.1%	100%	131
	2004	53%	26.3%	8.8%	4.8%	0%	0%	4.7%	0%	2.4%	100%	193
	2005	59.3%	13.7%	12.9%	3.1%	0.3%	1.1%	8.3%	0%	1.3%	100%	296
	2006	65.6%	15.5%	10.4%	5.9%	0%	0.5%	1.3%	0.1%	0.7%	100%	465
	2007	74.9%	8.2%	10.2%	2%	0%	0%	3.1%	0%	1.6%	100%	64
Gender of Head of Household	Female	61.3%	14.4%	13.2%	6.8%	0%	1%	2%	0.1%	1.2%	100%	275
	Male	63.1%	19.1%	9%	3.9%	0.2%	0.2%	2.8%	0%	1.7%	100%	1,299
Children in the Household	No Children	58.9%	22%	11%	4.6%	0.1%	0.5%	1.4%	0%	1.5%	100%	579
	Children	65.6%	15.6%	9%	4.3%	0.1%	0.3%	3.5%	0%	1.6%	100%	995
Education of Household Head	Still in School	89.4%	4.2%	2.4%	0%	1.5%	0%	0%	0%	2.5%	100%	57
	Not Completed	41.3%	38.2%	9.2%	2.1%	0%	0%	9.2%	0%	0%	100%	40
	Elementary	40.9%	22.7%	14.1%	17.2%	0%	1.5%	2.7%	0%	0.9%	100%	107
	Prepatory	41.8%	26.8%	18.8%	7.6%	0%	0.3%	2%	0%	2.7%	100%	148
	Basic	73.9%	6.5%	17.2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2.4%	0%	100%	14
	Vocational Training	76.9%	7.6%	15.5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	8
	Secondary	55%	20.9%	12.7%	6.5%	0%	0.2%	2.7%	0%	2%	100%	166
	Intermediate Diploma	63.3%	15.5%	8.2%	4.9%	0%	1.3%	5.9%	0%	0.9%	100%	201
	Bachelor +	73.3%	14.6%	7%	1.3%	0.2%	0.1%	2%	0%	1.5%	100%	795
Employment Status of Household Head	Employed	64.3%	25.9%	5.9%	1.6%	0%	0%	0.6%	0%	1.7%	100%	735
	Unemployed	72%	6.7%	5.9%	12%	0%	0.4%	2.4%	0%	0.6%	100%	117
	Out of Workforce	59.5%	11%	15.1%	6.5%	0.2%	0.9%	5.1%	0.1%	1.6%	100%	722
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	49.1%	22%	13.9%	7%	0.1%	0.9%	4.9%	0.1%	2%	100%	691
	Not Registered	73%	15.4%	6.7%	2.6%	0.1%	0%	0.9%	0%	1.3%	100%	873
Status of Household Head's Permit	Valid	72.6%	15.9%	6%	2.8%	0.1%	0%	1.4%	0%	1.2%	100%	832
	Not Valid	45.2%	23.2%	16.5%	7.2%	0.1%	1.2%	4.4%	0.1%	2.1%	100%	562

Time of Arrival in Jordan for Household Head

Time of Arrival in Jordan for Household Head		Before 2003	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total	Sample Size
Total		32.3%	7.4%	13.4%	15.8%	26.7%	4.4%	100%	1,574
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	41.1%	6.2%	19.5%	15.3%	15.9%	2%	100%	276
	Low Wealth	41.3%	4.8%	12.5%	9.7%	24.3%	7.4%	100%	260
	Middle Wealth	28%	4.7%	7%	12%	38.5%	9.8%	100%	226
	High Wealth	18.9%	9.1%	13.1%	14.7%	38.1%	6.1%	100%	221
	Highest Wealth	28.5%	10.1%	12.5%	21.1%	26.4%	1.4%	100%	591
Religious Affiliation of Head of Household	Sunni	34%	6.7%	11.3%	14.9%	27.9%	5.2%	100%	949
	Shi'a	32.8%	11.1%	19.4%	11.9%	22.8%	2%	100%	273
	Catholic	27%	7.2%	12%	20.8%	28.4%	4.6%	100%	180
	Orthodox	32.6%	4.8%	14.4%	10.8%	35.4%	2%	100%	73
	Protestant	55.2%	0%	0%	44.8%	0%	0%	100%	3
	Nasatra	14.7%	6.8%	0%	42.1%	36.4%	0%	100%	6
	Sabean	5.5%	3.6%	23.7%	49%	13.2%	5%	100%	60
	Yazidi	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	1
	Others or not stated	39.9%	9.7%	20.5%	13.1%	12.5%	4.3%	100%	29
Gender of Head of Household	Female	38.3%	9.3%	9.2%	13.8%	23.2%	6.1%	100%	275
	Male	30.8%	7%	14.4%	16.2%	27.6%	3.9%	100%	1,299
Children in the Household	No Children	33.8%	7.7%	16.8%	12.8%	23.8%	5.1%	100%	579
	Children	31.3%	7.2%	11.1%	17.8%	28.8%	3.8%	100%	995
Education of Household Head	Still in School	11.8%	11.4%	3.2%	24.1%	47%	2.5%	100%	57
	Not Completed	59.5%	3.1%	20%	8.8%	5.6%	3%	100%	40
	Elementary	44.6%	4.5%	19.6%	13.2%	17.3%	0.8%	100%	107
	Prepatory	31.3%	8.4%	25.1%	11.8%	20.9%	2.5%	100%	148
	Basic	57.5%	6.5%	11.7%	7%	17.3%	0%	100%	14
	Vocational Training	76.3%	4.1%	0%	5%	14.6%	0%	100%	8
	Secondary	32%	4.7%	14.4%	19.1%	28%	1.8%	100%	166
	Intermediate Diploma	38.6%	3.4%	12.9%	17.5%	26%	1.6%	100%	201
	Bachelor +	26.8%	8.9%	9.9%	17.2%	30.7%	6.5%	100%	795
Employment Status of Household Head	Employed	39.6%	9%	16.3%	15.8%	17.9%	1.4%	100%	735
	Unemployed	16.2%	5.1%	6.4%	14.1%	55.1%	3.1%	100%	117
	Out of Workforce	26.6%	6%	11.1%	16.1%	32.1%	8.1%	100%	722
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	31.6%	5.4%	17.1%	17.2%	26.1%	2.6%	100%	691
	Not Registered	32.8%	9.1%	10.7%	14.8%	27.4%	5.2%	100%	873
Status of Household Head's Permit	Valid	35.3%	8.7%	10.5%	16.1%	24.1%	5.3%	100%	832
	Not Valid	27.3%	7.1%	17.2%	16.5%	29.2%	2.7%	100%	562

The plurality of household heads of lesser means arrived in Jordan prior to 2003.

Children in the Household

Children in the Household		No Children	Children	Total	Sample Size
Total		39.9%	60.1%	100%	1,690
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	56.1%	43.9%	100%	306
	Low Wealth	37.1%	62.9%	100%	287
	Middle Wealth	39.5%	60.5%	100%	243
	High Wealth	34.3%	65.7%	100%	231
	Highest Wealth	33.4%	66.6%	100%	623
Arrival of Head of Household in Jordan	Before 2003	42.2%	57.8%	100%	425
	2003	41.8%	58.2%	100%	131
	2004	50.7%	49.3%	100%	193
	2005	32.8%	67.2%	100%	296
	2006	35.9%	64.1%	100%	465
	2007	47.6%	52.4%	100%	64
Religious Affiliation of Head of Household	Sunni	37.9%	62.1%	100%	949
	Shi'a	48.8%	51.2%	100%	273
	Catholic	45.2%	54.8%	100%	180
	Orthodox	42%	58%	100%	73
	Protestant	36.6%	63.4%	100%	3
	Nasatra	50.5%	49.5%	100%	6
	Sabean	21%	79%	100%	60
	Yazidi	-	100%	100%	1
	Others or not stated	39.3%	60.7%	100%	29
Gender of Head of Household	Female	57.2%	42.8%	100%	289
	Male	35.8%	64.2%	100%	1,401
Education of Household Head	Still in School	65.3%	34.7%	100%	59
	Not Completed	26.7%	73.3%	100%	52
	Elementary	56.4%	43.6%	100%	121
	Prepatory	45.4%	54.6%	100%	158
	Basic	34%	66%	100%	19
	Vocational Training	12.2%	87.8%	100%	10
	Secondary	38.5%	61.5%	100%	192
	Intermediate Diploma	29.4%	70.6%	100%	215
	Bachelor +	37.2%	62.8%	100%	824
Employment Status of Household Head	Employed	32%	68%	100%	808
	Unemployed	29.5%	70.5%	100%	126
	Out of Workforce	51.5%	48.5%	100%	756
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	45.6%	54.4%	100%	691
	Not Registered	36.6%	63.4%	100%	873
Status of Household Head's Permit	Valid	35.6%	64.4%	100%	832
	Not Valid	47.4%	52.6%	100%	562

Refugees with the least wealth are the least likely to have children in the household.

Over half of households headed by women do not have children in the household.

Over 70% of unemployed refugees have children in the household.

Household Size for Iraqi Households

Household Size for Iraqi Households		25 Percentile	Median	75 Percentile	Mean	Sample Size
Total		3	4	5	4.1	1,690
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	2	3	4	3.2	306
	Low Wealth	2	4	5	3.7	287
	Middle Wealth	3	4	5	4.2	243
	High Wealth	3	4	6	4.4	231
	Highest Wealth	3	5	6	4.7	623
Arrival of Head of Household in Jordan	Before 2003	3	4	5	3.7	425
	2003	3	4	5	4.1	131
	2004	2	4	5	4	193
	2005	3	4	5	4.2	296
	2006	3	4	5	4.4	465
	2007	2	3	5	3.8	64
Religious Affiliation of Head of Household	Sunni	3	4	5	4.2	949
	Shi'a	2	3	5	3.6	273
	Catholic	2	4	5	3.8	180
	Orthodox	3	4	5	4.1	73
	Protestant	2	4	4	3.5	3
	Nasatra	3	3	7	4.7	6
	Sabean	3	4	6	4.4	60
	Yazidi	8	8	8	8	1
	Others or not stated	3	4	5	3.7	29
Gender of Head of Household	Female	2	3	4	3	289
	Male	3	4	5	4.3	1,401
Children in the Household	No Children	1	2	3	2.6	619
	Children	4	5	6	5.1	1,071
Education of Household Head	Still in School	2	2	4	2.8	59
	Not Completed	3	3	5	3.9	52
	Elementary	1	3	5	3.4	121
	Prepatory	2	4	5	4.1	158
	Basic	2	3	4	3.2	19
	Vocational Training	5	5	5	4.5	10
	Secondary	3	4	5	4.2	192
	Intermediate Diploma	3	4	5	4.3	215
	Bachelor +	3	4	5	4.3	824
Employment Status of Household Head	Employed	3	4	5	4.2	808
	Unemployed	3	4	6	4.4	126
	Out of Workforce	2	4	5	3.8	756
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	2	4	5	3.7	691
	Not Registered	3	4	6	4.3	873
Status of Household Head's Permit	Valid	3	4	5	4.3	832
	Not Valid	2	4	5	3.6	562

The mean household size of heads of household arriving in 2007 was the lowest since before 2003.

Families with Protestant heads of household have the lowest mean household size.

Unemployed heads of household have the largest mean household size.

Economic Situation Compared to 2002

Economic Situation Compared to 2002		Much Better	Better	The Same	Worse	Much Worse	Total	Sample Size
Total		4.8%	13.6%	18.9%	38.7%	24%	100%	1,687
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	4.8%	9.9%	9.9%	45.8%	29.6%	100%	306
	Low Wealth	1.2%	12.5%	22.7%	36.4%	27.1%	100%	287
	Middle Wealth	5.7%	10.6%	14.8%	41.6%	27.2%	100%	242
	High Wealth	4%	14.8%	15.3%	41.4%	24.6%	100%	231
	Highest Wealth	6.8%	17.4%	25%	33.5%	17.4%	100%	621
Arrival of Head of Household in Jordan	Before 2003	4.9%	11.8%	25.5%	36.8%	21%	100%	425
	2003	9.7%	7.2%	21.9%	41.3%	20%	100%	131
	2004	0.5%	26%	9.8%	43.9%	19.8%	100%	193
	2005	6.8%	13.5%	14.5%	38.2%	27%	100%	295
	2006	5.7%	11.9%	14.8%	38.7%	28.9%	100%	464
	2007	0.5%	4.1%	26.9%	38.5%	30.1%	100%	64
Religious Affiliation of Head of Household	Sunni	4.9%	11.8%	19.1%	38.5%	25.7%	100%	949
	Shi'a	4.7%	22.4%	16.2%	42.7%	14.1%	100%	272
	Catholic	3.3%	11.4%	26.6%	33%	25.8%	100%	179
	Orthodox	14.7%	7.1%	13.9%	43.9%	20.4%	100%	73
	Protestant	-	36.6%	18.6%	44.8%	-	100%	3
	Nasatra	-	-	-	14.1%	85.9%	100%	6
	Sabean	2.8%	4.5%	9.5%	32.1%	51.1%	100%	60
	Yazidi	-	-	-	100%	-	100%	1
	Others or not stated	-	15.9%	13.4%	49.2%	21.5%	100%	29
Gender of Head of Household	Female	9.5%	9.4%	18.1%	39.6%	23.4%	100%	288
	Male	3.6%	14.7%	19.1%	38.4%	24.2%	100%	1,398
Children in the Household	No Children	5.8%	15.9%	21%	37.2%	20.1%	100%	619
	Children	4.1%	12.1%	17.4%	39.7%	26.7%	100%	1,067
Education of Household Head	Still in School	15.4%	18.4%	22.3%	38.1%	5.8%	100%	59
	Not Completed	1.6%	16.5%	13.1%	50.3%	18.4%	100%	52
	Elementary	6.6%	11.2%	16%	42.2%	24%	100%	121
	Prepatory	7.7%	18.9%	11.1%	35%	27.2%	100%	158
	Basic	20.4%	10%	30.5%	15.1%	24%	100%	19
	Vocational Training	-	9%	3.7%	72.7%	14.6%	100%	10
	Secondary	1.5%	16.7%	15.8%	43.6%	22.4%	100%	192
	Intermediate Diploma	4%	12.1%	14.4%	40.6%	28.9%	100%	214
	Bachelor +	3.3%	13%	24.1%	35.1%	24.5%	100%	821
Employment Status of Household Head	Employed	3.8%	16.4%	22.7%	40.1%	17.1%	100%	806
	Unemployed	8.9%	3.1%	10%	32.8%	45.1%	100%	126
	Out of Workforce	5.2%	12.2%	15.8%	38%	28.7%	100%	754
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	3.9%	12.4%	12.2%	40.1%	31.3%	100%	691
	Not Registered	5.8%	14.3%	22.5%	38.3%	19.1%	100%	871
Status of Household Head's Permit	Valid	6.6%	14.3%	23.2%	36.6%	19.4%	100%	831
	Not Valid	2.7%	12.8%	11.7%	41.3%	31.4%	100%	561

Life Satisfaction

Life Satisfaction		Dissatisfied	Content	Satisfied	Total	Sample Size
Total		27.2%	47.3%	25.5%	100%	1,691
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	50.4%	42.5%	7.1%	100%	306
	Low Wealth	34.9%	53.8%	11.2%	100%	287
	Middle Wealth	24.8%	48.3%	26.9%	100%	243
	High Wealth	23.8%	50.2%	26%	100%	231
	Highest Wealth	10.3%	45.3%	44.4%	100%	624
Compared to 2002, how has your household's economic situation changed?	Much Better	12.4%	30.2%	57.4%	100%	62
	Better	16.8%	45.7%	37.5%	100%	244
	The Same	6.5%	56%	37.5%	100%	344
	Worse	32.3%	48.4%	19.3%	100%	600
	Much Worse	44.5%	43.1%	12.4%	100%	437
Generally, do you think that most people can be trusted?	Yes, most people can be trusted	22.4%	39.1%	38.5%	100%	372
	Yes, some but not all can be trusted	25.3%	51.3%	23.4%	100%	699
	No, only a few people can be trusted	28.3%	51.9%	19.9%	100%	484
	No, generally people cannot be trusted	48.3%	34.6%	17.1%	100%	136
Arrival of Head of Household in Jordan	Before 2003	28.4%	45.4%	26.2%	100%	425
	2003	26.2%	46.4%	27.4%	100%	131
	2004	42.5%	40.2%	17.3%	100%	193
	2005	21.4%	51.3%	27.3%	100%	296
	2006	23.4%	51%	25.6%	100%	465
	2007	22.1%	46.1%	31.8%	100%	64
Religious Affiliation of Head of Household	Sunni	24.2%	47.5%	28.3%	100%	949
	Shi'a	37.5%	42%	20.5%	100%	273
	Catholic	25.6%	48.4%	26%	100%	180
	Orthodox	19.4%	65.4%	15.2%	100%	73
	Protestant	-	36.6%	63.4%	100%	3
	Nasatra	49.5%	50.5%	-	100%	6
	Sabean	47%	46.7%	6.3%	100%	60
	Yazidi	100%	-	-	100%	1
	Others or not stated	33.5%	41.5%	25%	100%	29
Education of Household Head	Still in School	11.5%	52.1%	36.4%	100%	59
	Not Completed	15.4%	76.4%	8.2%	100%	52
	Elementary	47.4%	38.5%	14.1%	100%	121
	Prepatory	40.7%	42%	17.4%	100%	158
	Basic	20.4%	49.8%	29.8%	100%	19
	Vocational Training	21.4%	71%	7.6%	100%	10
	Secondary	33%	47.4%	19.7%	100%	192
	Intermediate Diploma	39.3%	40.5%	20.1%	100%	215
	Bachelor +	16.4%	48.9%	34.6%	100%	824
Employment Status of Household Head	Employed	25.6%	47.1%	27.3%	100%	808
	Unemployed	35.1%	48.4%	16.5%	100%	126
	Out of Workforce	27.8%	47.5%	24.8%	100%	756

Gender

Gender		Male	Female	Total	Sample Size
Total		44.5%	55.5%	100%	6,638
Age Groups	Less than 6	51.3%	48.7%	100%	809
	6-14 years	50.7%	49.3%	100%	1,171
	15-24 years	46.9%	53.1%	100%	1,234
	25-64 years	39.9%	60.1%	100%	3,094
	65 and older	50.4%	49.6%	100%	330
Religious Affiliation	Sunni	43.9%	56.1%	100%	4,121
	Shi'a	46.4%	53.6%	100%	1,099
	Catholic	45.3%	54.7%	100%	726
	Orthodox	40.7%	59.3%	100%	282
	Protestant	63.3%	36.7%	100%	11
	Nasatra	25.9%	74.1%	100%	25
	Sabean	49.6%	50.4%	100%	269
	Yazidi	62.5%	37.5%	100%	8
	Others or not stated	54%	46%	100%	97
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	38.5%	61.5%	100%	986
	Low Wealth	47.2%	52.8%	100%	1,022
	Middle Wealth	46.7%	53.3%	100%	913
	High Wealth	42.4%	57.6%	100%	960
	Highest Wealth	46.4%	53.6%	100%	2,757
Education	Still in School	50%	50%	100%	1,759
	Not Completed	49.8%	50.2%	100%	805
	Elementary	42.7%	57.3%	100%	428
	Prepatory	41.2%	58.8%	100%	457
	Basic	36.8%	63.2%	100%	119
	Vocational Training	62.1%	37.9%	100%	15
	Secondary	34.1%	65.9%	100%	552
	Intermediate Diploma	45.4%	54.6%	100%	469
	Bachelor +	49%	51%	100%	1,362
Residing in Jordan since…	Before 2003	45.7%	54.3%	100%	1,362
	2003	25.6%	74.4%	100%	532
	2004	51.1%	48.9%	100%	860
	2005	48.3%	51.7%	100%	1,319
	2006	46.9%	53.1%	100%	2,226
	2007	42.3%	57.7%	100%	6,307
Place of residence	Not in 'Amman	33.7%	66.3%	100%	331
	In 'Amman	47.9%	52.1%	100%	6,307
Validity and Permit	Expired Permit or No Permit	41.9%	58.1%	100%	2,879
	Valid Permit	46.6%	53.4%	100%	3,759
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	51.1%	48.9%	100%	2,807
	Not Registered	40.3%	59.7%	100%	3,786

Over 60% of refugees age 25-64 are female.

An equal proportion of women and men are still in school.

Women are nearly twice as likely as men to live outside of 'Amman.

Age Group

Age Group		Less than 6	6-14 years	15-24 years	25-64 years	65 and older	Total	Sample Size
Total		11.7%	14.9%	17.6%	51.6%	4.1%	100%	6,638
Gender	Male	13.5%	17%	18.5%	46.3%	4.6%	100%	3,258
	Female	10.3%	13.3%	16.9%	55.9%	3.7%	100%	3,380
Religious Affiliation	Sunni	12.9%	15.1%	18%	50.2%	3.8%	100%	4,121
	Shia	9.5%	13.2%	16%	58%	3.3%	100%	1,099
	Catholic	9.6%	17.1%	14.1%	52.3%	6.9%	100%	726
	Orthodox	4.9%	11%	27.2%	49.1%	7.8%	100%	282
	Protestant	-	42.1%	21.2%	36.7%	-	100%	11
	Nasatra	2.4%	17.2%	14.1%	49.2%	17.1%	100%	25
	Sabean	14.1%	18.9%	15.8%	50%	1.2%	100%	269
	Yazidi	-	75%	-	25%	-	100%	8
	Others or not stated	10.8%	12.4%	19.7%	53.3%	3.8%	100%	97
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	9.6%	15.1%	10.3%	62.8%	2.2%	100%	986
	Low Wealth	19.7%	14%	13.5%	50.3%	2.6%	100%	1,022
	Middle Wealth	11.2%	16.2%	17.7%	49.3%	5.6%	100%	913
	High Wealth	11.1%	17.2%	15.1%	50.6%	6%	100%	960
	Highest Wealth	9.9%	14.1%	23.6%	47.8%	4.6%	100%	2,757
Education	Still in School	6.9%	50.4%	38.7%	4.1%	-	100%	1,759
	Not Completed	67.3%	11.5%	4.2%	15.2%	1.7%	100%	805
	Elementary	-	12.2%	20.3%	60.9%	6.5%	100%	428
	Prepatory	-	1.3%	19.9%	74.6%	4.2%	100%	457
	Basic	-	-	63.6%	34.3%	2.1%	100%	119
	Vocational Training	-	-	6.7%	93.3%	-	100%	15
	Secondary	-	-	20.3%	75.1%	4.7%	100%	552
	Intermediate Diploma	-	-	3.2%	89.2%	7.6%	100%	469
	Bachelor +	-	-	8.1%	85.3%	6.6%	100%	1,674
Residing in Jordan since…	Before 2003	4.5%	14%	18.5%	57.9%	5.1%	100%	1,362
	2003	5.6%	9.8%	9.3%	73%	2.3%	100%	532
	2004	12.5%	17.7%	17.9%	48.2%	3.8%	100%	860
	2005	15.2%	17.3%	15.5%	48.6%	3.4%	100%	1,319
	2006	15.4%	16.4%	21.8%	43.1%	3.4%	100%	2,226
	2007	23.5%	8.6%	12.2%	44.1%	11.6%	100%	337
Place of residence	Not in Amman	13.1%	11.7%	8.9%	64.9%	1.3%	100%	331
	In Amman	11.3%	15.9%	20.3%	47.5%	5%	100%	6,307
Validity and Permit	Expired Permit or No Permit	13.3%	15%	12.8%	55.6%	3.4%	100%	2,879
	Valid Permit	10.6%	14.9%	21.3%	48.6%	4.6%	100%	3,759
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	10.7%	18.6%	17.6%	50.2%	2.9%	100%	2,807
	Not Registered	12%	12.8%	17.4%	52.9%	4.9%	100%	3,786

More than a quarter of refugees are age 14 or younger.

Almost 20% of refugees in the "low wealth" category are less than six years old.

Less than 10% of Iraqi refugees 65 and older have a bachelor's degree; more than 85% age 25-64, however, do.

Religious Affiliation

Religious Affiliation		Sunni	Shi'a	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant	Nasatra	Sabean	Yazidi	Others or not stated	Total	Sample Size
Total		67.5%	16.5%	8.2%	3.6%	0.1%	0.4%	2.5%	0%	1.1%	100%	6,639
Gender	Male	66.6%	17.2%	8.3%	3.3%	0.1%	0.2%	2.8%	0.1%	1.4%	100%	3,258
	Female	68.2%	16%	8%	3.9%	0.1%	0.5%	2.3%	0%	0.9%	100%	3,381
Age Groups	Less than 6	74.3%	13.4%	6.7%	1.5%	-	0.1%	3%	-	1%	100%	809
	6-14 years	68.3%	14.6%	9.3%	2.7%	0.3%	0.5%	3.2%	0.2%	0.9%	100%	1,171
	15-24 years	68.9%	15%	6.5%	5.6%	0.1%	0.3%	2.3%	-	1.3%	100%	1,234
	25-64 years	65.6%	18.6%	8.3%	3.5%	0.1%	0.4%	2.4%	0%	1.2%	100%	3,094
	65 and older	62.6%	13.3%	13.6%	7%	-	1.7%	0.7%	-	1%	100%	331
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	66%	16.3%	5%	3.9%	-	0.1%	7.5%	0.2%	1%	100%	987
	Low Wealth	61.3%	12.9%	14%	4.1%	0.1%	2%	3.6%	-	1.9%	100%	1,022
	Middle Wealth	64.2%	7.2%	14.2%	9.7%	-	0.5%	3.1%	-	1.1%	100%	913
	High Wealth	61%	27%	9.6%	1.3%	-	-	0.6%	-	0.6%	100%	960
	Highest Wealth	73.8%	17.6%	5%	2.2%	0.2%	-	0.1%	-	1.1%	100%	2,757
Residing in Jordan since…	Before 2003	70.2%	15.6%	7.9%	3.7%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	-	1.7%	100%	1,362
	2003	64.7%	28.6%	3%	1.8%	-	0.1%	0.7%	-	1.1%	100%	532
	2004	62.8%	15.3%	10.8%	4%	-	-	4.9%	-	2.2%	100%	860
	2005	61.1%	14.8%	10.8%	3.1%	0.3%	0.7%	8.1%	-	1.1%	100%	1,320
	2006	70.3%	15.1%	7.9%	4.6%	-	0.7%	1%	0.1%	0.3%	100%	2,226
	2007	74.3%	8.8%	9.1%	2.7%	-	-	4%	-	1%	100%	337
Education	Still in School	74.9%	14%	5.6%	3.5%	0.2%	-	0.5%	-	1.3%	100%	1,759
	Not Completed	66.6%	16.1%	8%	1.9%	-	0.5%	5.7%	0.1%	1%	100%	805
	Elementary	45.2%	24.6%	13.2%	8%	-	1.9%	4.9%	0.1%	1.9%	100%	428
	Prepatory	48.8%	18.6%	18.8%	6.1%	-	1.3%	4.6%	0.1%	1.7%	100%	457
	Basic	56%	16.3%	19.1%	2.5%	-	0.7%	5.1%	0.3%	-	100%	119
	Vocational Training	81.7%	4%	8.2%	4.4%	-	-	1.7%	-	-	100%	15
	Secondary	64.5%	15.1%	11.1%	6.2%	-	0.1%	2.1%	-	0.9%	100%	552
	Intermediate Diploma	65.1%	16.9%	8.5%	4%	-	0.6%	4.5%	-	0.4%	100%	469
	Bachelor +	69.5%	19.7%	5.8%	2.2%	0.1%	0%	1.6%	-	1.1%	100%	1,674
Place of residence	Not in 'Amman	69.5%	19%	5.1%	5.6%	0.2%	-	-	-	0.6%	100%	331
	In 'Amman	66.9%	15.7%	9.1%	3%	0.1%	0.5%	3.3%	0.1%	1.3%	100%	6,308
Validity and Permit	Expired Permit or No Permit	59.7%	17.3%	12.2%	4.3%	0%	0.9%	4.3%	0.1%	1.2%	100%	2,880
	Valid Permit	73.5%	15.9%	5%	3.1%	0.1%	-	1.2%	-	1.1%	100%	3,759
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	53%	17.2%	15%	6%	0.1%	1.1%	5.8%	0.1%	1.7%	100%	2,807
	Not Registered	75.4%	16.4%	4.3%	2.3%	0.1%	-	0.7%	-	0.8%	100%	3,787

Plans to Leave Jordan

Plans to Leave Jordan		Yes	No	Don't Know	Total	Sample Size
Total		21%	77.5%	1.4%	100%	6638
Gender	Male	22.8%	75.6%	1.7%	100%	3257
	Female	19.6%	79.1%	1.3%	100%	3381
Age Groups	Less than 6	18.8%	78.7%	2.5%	100%	809
	6-14 years	24%	74.3%	1.6%	100%	1171
	15-24 years	22.3%	75.7%	1.9%	100%	1234
	25-64 years	20.6%	78.3%	1.1%	100%	3093
	65 and older	15.8%	83.5%	0.8%	100%	331
Religious Affiliation	Sunni	13.7%	84.7%	1.6%	100%	4121
	Shi'a	17.4%	81.6%	1%	100%	1099
	Catholic	59.2%	40.3%	0.5%	100%	726
	Orthodox	42.6%	55.9%	1.5%	100%	282
	Protestant	26.9%	73.1%	-	100%	11
	Nasatra	100%	-	-	100%	25
	Sabean	69.2%	30.8%	-	100%	269
	Yazidi	87.5%	12.5%	-	100%	8
	Others or not stated	22.4%	63.6%	14.1%	100%	97
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	27.3%	71.2%	1.5%	100%	986
	Low Wealth	35.6%	64.3%	0.1%	100%	1022
	Middle Wealth	30.8%	63.3%	5.9%	100%	913
	High Wealth	20%	79%	1%	100%	960
	Highest Wealth	9.3%	89.9%	0.8%	100%	2757
Education	Still in School	16%	83.1%	0.9%	100%	1759
	Not Completed	23.5%	74.5%	2%	100%	805
	Elementary	37.1%	58.3%	4.6%	100%	428
	Prepatory	36.7%	59.6%	3.7%	100%	457
	Basic	34.4%	65.6%	-	100%	119
	Vocational Training	24.6%	75.4%	-	100%	15
	Secondary	21.1%	78.5%	0.4%	100%	552
	Intermediate Diploma	25.5%	74.2%	0.3%	100%	469
	Bachelor +	16.9%	81.5%	1.7%	100%	1673
Residing in Jordan since…	Before 2003	24%	76%	0.1%	100%	1362
	2003	9.3%	89.6%	1.1%	100%	532
	2004	24.9%	73.8%	1.3%	100%	859
	2005	25.9%	73.6%	0.5%	100%	1320
	2006	20.1%	78.9%	0.9%	100%	2226
	2007	16.8%	67.2%	16%	100%	337
Place of residence	Not in 'Amman	13.5%	86.5%	-	100%	331
	In 'Amman	23.3%	74.7%	1.9%	100%	6307
Validity and Permit	Expired Permit or No Permit	31.9%	67.9%	0.2%	100%	2879
	Valid Permit	12.5%	85%	2.5%	100%	3759

More than three-quarters of refugees do not plan to leave Jordan.

Nearly 60% of Catholics plan to leave Jordan.

Nearly 90% of refugees with the most wealth plan to leave Jordan.

Plans to Go Back to Iraq

Plans to Go Back to Iraq		Yes	No	Don't Know	Total	Sample Size
Total		40.8%	57.9%	1.4%	100%	6639
Gender	Male	43.5%	55%	1.5%	100%	3258
	Female	38.5%	60.2%	1.2%	100%	3381
Age Groups	Less than 6	39.5%	58.3%	2.2%	100%	809
	6-14 years	37%	62.7%	0.3%	100%	1171
	15-24 years	47.4%	51.9%	0.8%	100%	1234
	25-64 years	38.8%	59.5%	1.7%	100%	3094
	65 and older	54.7%	44.3%	1%	100%	331
Religious Affiliation	Sunni	43%	55.7%	1.3%	100%	4122
	Shi'a	42.4%	56.8%	0.9%	100%	1099
	Catholic	30.5%	67.9%	1.6%	100%	726
	Orthodox	36.8%	62%	1.1%	100%	282
	Protestant	73.1%	-	26.9%	100%	11
	Nasatra	-	100%	-	100%	25
	Sabean	7.7%	88%	4.3%	100%	269
	Yazidi	12.5%	87.5%	-	100%	8
	Others or not stated	56.6%	41.8%	1.5%	100%	97
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	20%	78.9%	1.2%	100%	987
	Low Wealth	24.4%	75.4%	0.3%	100%	1022
	Middle Wealth	41.1%	56.7%	2.2%	100%	913
	High Wealth	44.5%	54.7%	0.8%	100%	960
	Highest Wealth	56.3%	41.9%	1.8%	100%	2757
Education	Still in School	47.1%	52.4%	0.4%	100%	1759
	Not Completed	36.6%	61.9%	1.6%	100%	805
	Elementary	29.8%	69.7%	0.5%	100%	428
	Prepatory	35.6%	62.6%	1.9%	100%	457
	Basic	31.9%	64.7%	3.4%	100%	119
	Vocational Training	7.6%	92.4%	-	100%	15
	Secondary	47.3%	51.4%	1.2%	100%	552
	Intermediate Diploma	40.2%	57.4%	2.4%	100%	469
	Bachelor +	47.7%	50.2%	2.1%	100%	1674
Residing in Jordan since…	Before 2003	32%	66.5%	1.5%	100%	1362
	2003	19.9%	78.7%	1.3%	100%	532
	2004	40.3%	58.6%	1.1%	100%	860
	2005	43.4%	54.2%	2.4%	100%	1320
	2006	52.4%	47.3%	0.3%	100%	2226
	2007	48.5%	46.8%	4.6%	100%	337
Place of residence	Not in 'Amman	22.4%	77.5%	0.1%	100%	331
	In 'Amman	46.5%	51.7%	1.7%	100%	6308
Validity and Permit	Expired Permit or No Permit	29%	70.2%	0.7%	100%	2880
	Valid Permit	49.8%	48.4%	1.8%	100%	3759

Nearly 55% of refugees 65 and older plan to return to Iraq.

Over three-quarters of families with the lowest amounts of wealth do not plan to return to Iraq.

More than half of refugees with the highest amount of wealth plan to return to Iraq.

Gave Birth Last Five Years in Jordan

Gave Birth Last 5 Years in Jordan		Gave birth to live child last 5 years in Jordan	Did not give birth	Total	Sample Size
Total		24.1%	75.9%	100%	860
Age Groups	15-24 years	9.2%	90.8%	100%	36
	25-64 years	24.9%	75.1%	100%	824
Religious Affiliation	Sunni	25.4%	74.6%	100%	545
	Shi'a	26.6%	73.4%	100%	132
	Catholic	19.3%	80.7%	100%	95
	Orthodox	-	100%	100%	27
	Protestant	-	100%	100%	2
	Nasatra	-	100%	100%	2
	Sabean	19.3%	80.7%	100%	43
	Yazidi	-	100%	100%	1
	Others or not stated	31.2%	68.8%	100%	13
Household Wealth in Quintiles	Lowest Wealth	14.5%	85.5%	100%	127
	Low Wealth	30.8%	69.2%	100%	151
	Middle Wealth	23.9%	76.1%	100%	164
	High Wealth	20.4%	79.6%	100%	202
	Highest Wealth	30.2%	69.8%	100%	216
Education	Still in School	9.5%	90.5%	100%	38
	Not Completed	70.9%	29.1%	100%	17
	Elementary	15.2%	84.8%	100%	51
	Prepatory	24.8%	75.2%	100%	93
	Basic	78%	22%	100%	8
	Vocational Training	4.1%	95.9%	100%	5
	Secondary	20.9%	79.1%	100%	103
	Intermediate Diploma	29.8%	70.2%	100%	134
	Bachelor +	22.5%	77.5%	100%	405
Residing in Jordan since…	Before 2003	38%	62%	100%	202
	2003	23.1%	76.9%	100%	68
	2004	24.6%	75.4%	100%	112
	2005	22.1%	77.9%	100%	182
	2006	10.6%	89.4%	100%	275
	2007	18.3%	81.7%	100%	21
Place of residence	Not in 'Amman	23.1%	76.9%	100%	45
	In 'Amman	24.4%	75.6%	100%	815
Validity and Permit	Expired Permit or No Permit	18.5%	81.5%	100%	376
	Valid Permit	28.5%	71.5%	100%	484
Registration of Household with UNCHR	Registered	18.9%	81.1%	100%	381
	Not Registered	28%	72%	100%	471

Less than 15% of women with the lowest wealth gave birth to a live child in the last five years in Jordan.

Nearly one-third of women with the highest wealth gave birth to a live child in the last five years in Jordan.

Refugee Testimonies

The bulk of media attention given to Iraqi refugees has gone to those fleeing to neighboring Jordan and Syria. Less well publicized is the plight of the approximately 150,000 Iraqis seeking shelter in Cairo, Egypt. There they face harassment, theft, and a dangerous and paradoxical situation: Egypt will not allow them to stay, and Iraq is too dangerous to return home. Their children are barred from attending public schools, and they cannot work to earn a living. The Iraqi Voices in Cairo project seeks to bring attention to their situation by publishing their stories and articles free for use by other media outlets. A short documentary film about Iraqi refugees in Cairo can be found at http://www.iraqisinegypt.org, and the project's homepage is http://www.iraqisinegypt.org/voices. The Project operates under the supervision of Dr. Barbara Harrell-Bond at the American University in Cairo. The following accounts are translated from interviews conducted by an Iraqi journalist, himself a refugee. Names have been changed to protect those interviewed.

INTERVIEW WITH KHALID IBRAHIM

Khalid, 36 years old, says, "I arrived in Egypt on September 2, 2006 after a severely painful period in Iraq. I applied immediately to the Commission for Refugees, and received refugee status, but I remained waiting for an interview appointment until January 23, 2007. The interview was nothing more than receiving the Yellow Card [provisional refugee status card] and the question: 'Are you Sunni or Shi'a?'"

He currently lives in the neighborhood of Sixth October City with his family, which consists of himself, his wife, and his two children.

Speaking about his work in Iraq, he says, "I am one of Iraq's champion body builders, and I owned a center for training and rehabilitating athletes for championships. The center was burned down by unknown persons — we do not know who was behind it — but it was certainly the work of a terrorist. I was threatened more than one time by people who would come to my center and demand that I close it or I would die. I did not obey their orders and so they kidnapped my five-year-old daughter on July 27, 2007 [sic: the year is probably an error, meaning 2005]. After three days, they released my daughter and burned down the sports center. There was nothing left for me except to flee in fear from the seriousness of the threats. The problem was that I did not have sufficient money to travel — how and where would we live and from what source would I support my family? I turned to friends and relatives to lend us any sum of money and was able to gather enough to make it possible for us to travel to Egypt and live there for a period of time."

"At the time of my arrival in Egypt, I rented a flat for 400 Egyptian pounds a month [$75] and was expecting that I would work in my field of specialization so that my family and I could live. However, I and many other Iraqis were not able to get work, so today I live off of the assistance of friends here. We do not own any of the basic elements of human life." As for his opinion of the Commission [for Refugees], he says, "nothing in my life surprised me the way that the Commission in Egypt did — I was expecting that when I arrived there (the Commission, I mean) they would provide assistance because I was going through a very difficult time psychologically and physically. They didn't even concern themselves to question me, knowing that I am wounded by shrapnel from a hand grenade explosion during the war and that I suffer from terrible pain. I am not able to get treatment or to buy the drugs I need."

When asked if he expects to return to Iraq or stay in Egypt, he says, "Some days, the world turns black before my eyes, and I say that I will return to let whatever will happen, happen — because death would be better than the life of humiliation that we now live. The thing that stops me is the lack of the necessary monetary resources for return. As for staying in Egypt, that is a harder decision than the decision of returning to Iraq. All that we had hoped for from this country was that it would pay attention to our plight and lend a helping hand."

INTERVIEW WITH RAJA

Raja, an Iraqi woman, says that she arrived in Egypt in August of 2006 with her husband and children and turned immediately to the Refugee Commission. She added that she had hoped to receive a lot of help from the Commission, but "they completely ignored us and in the end they — the Commission – all that concerned them was the question about our family's makeup: Shi'a or Sunni."

As for their exposure to threats in Iraq, she said that her husband was previously associated with one of the security apparatuses and that he was Sunni. This situation continued until the fall of Saddam's regime and the dissolution of the armed forces. Her husband became unemployed, but after a short time, it was possible for him to obtain employment at one of the banks as a security guard.

"The situation became increasingly worse after the explosions in Samarra – we were near to it, living in a city mixed between Shi'a and Sunni. We received direct death threats. We were forced to flee after we borrowed money.

After our arrival in Egypt — specifically, at the airport — we were exposed to theft, and the amount that we had with us ($6,000), all that we owned, was stolen. The world blackened in our eyes, and my husband suffered from a nervous tic that resembled a sort of quasi-palsy. We were in a terrible state.

From the first day, we sought loans for our living requirements, and the matter reached the point where we would spend more than two days without food. To remind you, we have two children. My husband tried to get work but met with great difficulty; he worked multiple jobs but to no avail. He was dismissed numerous times."

Regarding the assistance that she and her family received, she said "the Caritas organization [a Catholic aid organization] credited us with 250 Egyptian Pounds [about 47 US dollars] in addition to paying the Commission the tuition installments for my daughter, since Egypt does not permit us to study in government schools – so the Catholic aid organization [Caritas] undertook the tuition payments at private schools."

"As for our dealings with the Commission, they did not reach the humanitarian level – they are neglectful towards Iraqis, and all that they will tell any of us about our problems is to use the Egyptian Government as an excuse – that it restricts their action – or that the Iraqi government requested that they not grant naturalization to Iraqis, etc. with pretexts and excuses.

As for today … after our crisis became critical in Egypt, my husband decided to return to Iraq. This was the hardest decision we had ever made as a family — he would be going to his death. We had two choices, and the sweetest of them was still bitter: staying in Egypt and with it abject poverty, or returning to Iraq and certain death. A month has passed since his return, and I know nothing about his fate as of today. I am torn between two alternatives: joining my husband about whom I know nothing, or remaining with my children by ourselves, battered by the storm."

These are the words of Mrs. Raja who spoke as tears formed in her eyes; I was not able to control my nerves either, and we both broke into tears.

INTERVIEW WITH IBRAHIM, AGE 31

Ibrahim spoke about the circumstances of his interview with the UN Refugee Commission, saying, "My family — which consists of my wife, myself, and my daughter [name withheld] — went to our interview at the appointed time. In the beginning came the question about our sect – Sunni or Shi'a — and why we left Iraq. They asked what pushed us to seek refuge in Egypt, if we were threatened in Iraq, if our living condition was OK, about our health, and where we were living. They gave us information about our rights as refugees with regards to the Commission and handed us the Yellow Card."

As for his reasons for coming to Egypt, he said, "I wanted to go to any place that would protect my family and me from terrorism and the sectarian militias in Baghdad. I have a friend in Egypt who got me a visa, and I came quickly, leaving everything behind, with only a modest amount of money in my pockets."

He, like many Iraqis, finished his university studies in the School of Fine Arts and completed his military service. He tried to look for employment in Iraq, but without luck. He said, "I traveled to Syria intending to find a way that would help me arrive in a country that respects humanity — but I returned to Iraq after a short time because I saw Syria as not being much different from Iraq at that time. When I returned to Iraq, I opened up a small barbershop in the Zayouna area[1] but did not enjoy the benefits of this shop."

"When the American forces entered Iraq, the labor sector suffered from recession. I had married just a short time before this, and I was forced to borrow large sums of money. After that, it was suggested to me by my cousin that I work with him in supplying the needs of the Americans — he had been procuring some of these things in Samarra. I worked with him for a time and afterwards worked as a barber at FOB Wilson,[2] in a shop assigned to my Jordanian cousin. I worked in total secrecy, fearing being 'liquidated.'"

Regarding his exposure to threats, he said, "I experienced threats from unknown persons, who threw an envelope at me containing a 9 mm bullet. I informed the police department of this and had a copy of [the warning]. After that, I fled to my relatives in the al-Khalij neighborhood, but I received threats from other militias there and decided to flee outside of Iraq — also, in February of 2007, terrorists blew up my barbershop, but by that time I was in Egypt where I

1. A mixed neighborhood in Baghdad.
2. An American military base near Ad-Dawr, the area where Saddam Husayn was captured.

met my cousin."

As for the circumstances of his life in Egypt, he said that his apartment has been robbed twice and that his wife has been threatened with theft. All of this happened in Sixth October City, and he has a record of the thefts. Regarding the extent of his readiness to stay in Egypt, or if he prefers to return to Iraq, he answered no, he does not want to stay in Egypt because he believes that it does not offer the conditions for foreigners to provide for themselves. Furthermore, there are no opportunities for decent work. As for returning to Iraq, he refused this quickly — he hopes to travel to a third country that can offer him and his family decent living conditions. He added that he sees daily that he is a *persona non grata* in Egypt through the harassment he receives in a small barbershop where he works. He sees the UNHCR's role negatively, in addition to other organizations such as Caritas that did not heed his pleas for aid.

INTERVIEW WITH MUEEN, AGE 69

"I arrived to Egypt in December of 2006, after getting a visa with the help of a friend living in Cairo. I left Iraq when I thought that it was impossible to stay there.

My sad story started during the last war when a projectile damaged my home in Baghdad. This caused a financial and psychological effect, and my wife died because she was afraid of the war — she could not handle the events and noises of bombings and explosions. I lost my wife and my home.

I left home and lived in a shelter until the war stopped. When the war stopped, we went back to our home to do some renovations. Our problems became bigger and bigger when my daughter was threatened by an unknown group. She worked in an insurance company as a translator. There was an assassination attempt against my older son who worked in the Nasir Company for the mechanical industry, and the kidnap and murder of my daughter's friend, who was an engineer in the Communication Ministry. This is why I left Iraq.

When I arrived in Egypt, I went to the UNHCR and got the Yellow Card, and medical and financial support from the Caritas organization because I have suffered from diabetes for ten years. Now I live in Sixth October City with my three daughters and nephew, without friends or relatives and suffering from home sickness, exile, and disappointment."

This is what Mr. Mueen said. I heard from his family that he is madly in love with plants and Arabic coffee, and now he has some plants and tools for preparing coffee to kill time, but it cannot redeem what he left in his country. He was always crying when he talked about his memories of Iraq.

Interviews conducted by Azher Adnan
Translation and editing by Aaron Reese

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